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JULIE GOLDSCHEID*
ABSTRACT 
 This Article evaluates the application of sex equality theory to the 
harms resulting from domestic and sexual violence.  Sex equality the-
ory and related antidiscrimination remedies widely have been her-
alded as holding the potential both to advance victims’ economic re-
covery and to transform public understanding of the problem.  Laws 
such as the civil rights remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women 
Act struck by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison 
are rooted in this theory.  Because Morrison rested on questions of 
federalism, the decision neither resolved nor addressed a large cate-
gory of concerns that led to the enactment of that and similar laws.   
 To reinvigorate discussion of those important issues, this Article 
reconsiders the value of framing the harm that flows from domestic 
and sexual violence as a civil rights violation.  I argue that civil rights 
remedies are important legal tools for victims of domestic and sexual 
violence.  Nevertheless, their practical appeal necessarily will be 
bounded by realities inherent in the nature of the remedy and in the 
nature and experience of abuse.  A variety of considerations, including 
survivors’ rational reluctance to reengage with an abuser,  will deter 
victims from invoking civil rights remedies.  Civil rights remedies’ 
transformative potential to produce either policy or other forms of so-
cial change will be limited unless their enactment and use are closely 
tied to grassroots organizing efforts.  I advocate alternative and com-
plementary approaches to the remedies’ dual and laudable goals of 
expanding avenues for economic recovery and transforming the dis-
criminatory attitudes that allow domestic and sexual violence to per-
sist. 
 I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................  732 
 II. THEORETICAL GROUNDINGS ................................................................................  735 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Sex equality has played a pivotal role in law reform and advocacy 
on behalf of victims of domestic and sexual violence.1 Arguments ex-
posing domestic and sexual violence as one of many manifestations of 
sex discrimination have figured centrally in spurring the wide range 
of reforms in the United States that assist domestic violence and 
sexual assault survivors. Yet tensions about how to situate an equal-
ity-based analysis continue to animate advocates’ debates. At the 
same time that domestic and sexual violence increasingly is equated 
with sex discrimination in international discourse, public debate 
within the United States about the link between sex discrimination 
and domestic and sexual violence is virtually absent from current 
mainstream policy debate.  
 Sex discrimination theories have formed the basis for civil reme-
dies that frame domestic and sexual violence as a problem of sex dis-
crimination. These remedies have been powerful tools in reshaping 
workplace laws and policies where domestic and sexual violence oc-
curs at work.2 Sex discrimination theories also underlie suits against 
 
 1. I use the descriptive term “domestic and sexual violence” rather than the com-
monly used terminology “violence against women,” because the latter term facially ex-
cludes intimate partner violence committed in same-sex relationships and implies that 
men cannot be victims of domestic and sexual violence.  
 2. See infra Part III.A.1. 
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public officials who commit acts of domestic or sexual violence.3 They 
have helped improve law enforcement policies directing police re-
sponse to domestic and sexual violence calls.4 Yet sex discrimination 
theory has had less of an impact in holding accountable the largest 
category of individuals who commit these acts: private individuals. A 
legal tool that sought to hold individuals accountable for domestic 
and sexual violence as sex discrimination, the federal civil rights 
remedy enacted as part of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA),5 was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Morrison.6 That law was modeled after Reconstruc-
tion-Era civil rights laws—none of which explicitly addressed gender 
and none of which authorized private rights of actions against pri-
vate individuals, who commit most acts of domestic and sexual vio-
lence.7 Although analogous state and local remedies remain on the 
books, those laws are not used as frequently as some might expect. 
International human rights instruments explicitly define domestic 
and sexual violence as a form of sex discrimination, but to date they 
have not employed the theory to support claims of individual liability 
against perpetrators.8   
 The Morrison decision rested on principles of federalism and the 
Court’s view of Congress’ authority to enact the VAWA civil rights 
remedy. As a result, it did not address the question of the relative 
benefits and limitations of using civil rights remedies premised on 
sex equality theories to provide redress for victims. This Article re-
turns to that discussion and assesses the remedy’s promise of ad-
vancing two important goals: the practical goal of more effectively 
redressing the economic harms resulting from abuse and the trans-
formational goal of reshaping public perceptions of the problem. I 
conclude that proponents were correct that gaps in previously exist-
ing civil rights laws often leave victims without a remedy. However, 
laws such as the VAWA civil rights remedy struck down in United 
States v. Morrison necessarily will have limited effect based on reali-
ties associated with the experience of abuse and the limits of civil 
rights claims alone to transform cultural norms. Civil rights remedy 
 
 3. See infra notes 73-80. 
 4. See infra notes 81-88. 
 5. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 
Stat. 1902, 1941-42 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)), invalidated by 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
 6. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (prohibiting racially discriminatory contracts); 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (creating a civil rights remedy for violations of federal law by state actors); 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (forbidding conspiracies to deny civil rights). 
 8. For a discussion of the role of equality-based remedies in international domestic 
and sexual violence reform, see Julie Goldscheid, Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Dis-
crimination: Comparing American and International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
355, 378-84 (2006). 
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proponents’ aspiration to increase victims’ access to practical relief, 
in the form of financial compensation, is laudable. The economic 
harms resulting from abuse are substantial and often create barriers 
to victims’ safety.9 Nevertheless, many victims will not commence 
civil damages claims due to a host of concerns, some of which are 
common to civil claims generally and some of which are unique to 
domestic and sexual violence. Although civil rights claims against 
the perpetrators of abuse should be available and used whenever 
possible, alternative approaches to financial compensation, such as 
victim compensation programs, should be enhanced in order to mean-
ingfully expand survivors’ ability to recover the financial losses that 
violence produces.  
 From a transformative perspective, civil rights remedies reflect a 
vision that framing domestic and sexual violence as gender discrimi-
nation would shift our collective understanding of the problem. The 
importance of that vision cannot be underestimated. However, it is 
overly optimistic to imagine that a civil remedy, divorced from other 
social and political organizing initiatives, could substantially ad-
vance so dramatic a result. The equation of domestic and sexual vio-
lence with gender inequality holds most power instrumentally, as a 
rhetorical tool. In the United States it was particularly catalytic in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s, as it produced a new lens that bridged legal, 
political and community organizing initiatives. That moment has 
passed. Domestic and sexual violence now is widely recognized in the 
United States, but responses to it increasingly are neutralized and 
bureaucratized. A renewed focus on the social conditions—including 
gender bias—that inform domestic and sexual violence, can galvanize 
organizing and policy initiatives that re-center the role of discrimina-
tion in the persistence of abuse.  
 This Article elaborates the history and impact of civil rights 
remedies as tools to address domestic and sexual violence. Part II be-
gins by reviewing the theoretical foundations for equating domestic 
and sexual violence with sex discrimination and the critiques of that 
theory. It then outlines how equality theory supported the develop-
ment of civil rights remedies to redress domestic and sexual violence.  
 Part III evaluates the practical and transformative potential of 
civil rights remedies. It tests the claim that gaps in existing civil 
rights laws limit redress by identifying both the reach and the limi-
tations of caselaw holding institutions and individuals accountable 
for domestic and sexual violence as a form of sex discrimination. This 
analysis demonstrates the doctrinal barriers to both individual and 
institutional accountability under current laws, and discusses the 
importance of addressing those doctrinal gaps. 
 
 9. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. 
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 Part III next explores the transformative potential of civil rights 
remedies from several perspectives: the impact on public and other 
policies, the potential to change discriminatory attitudes, and the 
role civil rights claims play as part of a larger social movement. It 
shows how claims against individuals hold less potential to engender 
policy changes than do claims against institutional actors. It draws 
on scholarship in other areas showing that claims to enforce “rights” 
are useful points of leverage as part of broader social movements, but 
on their own are limited in their ability to change discriminatory at-
titudes or public perceptions. Similarly, civil rights claims for domes-
tic and sexual violence today are constrained because they are not as 
closely connected to a social movement seeking gender and other 
forms of equality as were similar claims during earlier periods in his-
tory. The combination of these factors limit the extent to which civil 
rights remedies can produce transformative change.  
 Part IV offers suggestions for future reform. To the extent that a 
civil rights remedy offers practical solutions to the economic imbal-
ances that domestic and sexual violence produce, it is but one of sev-
eral possible strategies to reach that end. This Part discusses the 
limits of civil rights claims framed against individuals and identifies 
alternative approaches to enhancing victims’ ability to recover for the 
resulting economic losses. Expanded victim compensation programs 
exemplify one potential alternative; law reform that enhances mean-
ingful institutional accountability is another. With respect to the 
transformative claim, efforts that are grounded in victims’ experience 
hold the potential to generate new approaches to services and policy. 
Enhanced collaborations between lawyers, organizers, activists and 
survivors are key to meaningfully changing social norms. Public dis-
course should be refocused on challenging the enduring connections 
between gender and other forms of inequality, and the persistence of 
violence and abuse. 
II.   THEORETICAL GROUNDINGS 
A.   Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Discrimination 
 Feminist analyses exposing domestic and sexual violence as a 
form of sex discrimination figured centrally in the wave of reform 
that began in the 1960s. The anti-domestic violence and rape reform 
movements that emerged at that time, in tandem with the rebirth of 
feminism, marked a new generation of advocacy and reform.10 The 
sex discrimination framework offered an explicitly political analysis, 
in contrast to the traditional perspective in which domestic and sex-
 
 10. For sources and a brief summary of the emergence of the domestic and sexual vio-
lence movements, see Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 358-62.  
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ual violence, when identified as a problem, was addressed in terms of 
psychological pathologies and individual personality disorders.11 The 
political framework was grounded in a philosophical commitment to 
basing reform in women’s lived experiences.12 Arguments rooted in 
analyses of sex discrimination were instrumental in shifting public 
perception of the problem from a private matter to one warranting 
public attention and response.13  
 Many feminist theorists thus adopted what I will call a “categori-
cal” definition of domestic and sexual violence as a form of sex dis-
crimination. In reaction to the traditional approaches (in which do-
mestic and sexual violence was privatized, pathologized, and depoli-
ticized) and in an effort to emphasize the sociopolitical forces that in-
form the problem, domestic violence instead was termed “gender vio-
lence” or “violence against women.” Catherine MacKinnon’s writings 
most explicitly articulate the theory underlying this shift. For exam-
ple, she argued that “[w]omen are sexually assaulted because they 
are women: not individually or at random, but on the basis of sex, be-
cause of their membership in a group defined by gender.”14 Drawing 
on statistics showing that women are overwhelmingly the victims of 
sexual assault at the hands of men, she continued, 
Sexual violation symbolizes and actualizes women’s subordinate 
social status to men. It is both an indication and a practice of ine-
quality between the sexes, specifically of the low status of women 
relative to men. . . . Rape is an act of dominance over women that 
works systemically to maintain a gender-stratified society in which 
women occupy a disadvantaged status as the appropriate victims 
and targets of sexual aggression.15
MacKinnon analogized sexual assault to lynching and argued that 
sexual assault is a civil rights violation that violently humiliates its 
victims, that is hardly ever committed against members of powerful 
 
 11. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 
12-13 (2000); see also Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of 
Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 46-47 (2000) (discussing traditional treatment of domestic and 
sexual violence as “ ‘miscommunication’ ” or a “ ‘family’ ” or “ ‘private matter’ ”) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 101-545, at 36 (1990)). 
 12. For a more detailed discussion of this feminist method as applied to lawmaking, 
see SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 34-38; Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 688-89, 691 (2000); accord Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ig-
norance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 
America, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 331, 372 n.173 and accompanying text (2005) (discussing and 
citing approaches to strategies that theorize “from the facts on the ground”). 
 13. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 12-28; Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 57, 85. 
 14. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 
1281, 1301 (1991). 
 15. Id. at 1302. 
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groups, and that terrorizes the entire class of women.16 Although 
scholars have differed in their views about how this equality, or anti-
discrimination, theory applies in varying contexts, the notion that 
domestic and sexual violence are heavily gendered has been widely 
accepted.17 The statistics consistently showing that women over-
whelmingly are the victims of domestic and sexual violence are con-
tinual reminders that gender bias remains.18
 On the other hand, the rhetorical linking of domestic and sexual 
violence and its foregrounding of the social context has led to a flat 
equation that is inadequately nuanced. A categorical equation of do-
mestic and sexual violence with sex discrimination fails to take into 
account the complex ways in which other social factors—such as race, 
national origin, class, and sexual orientation—interact with gender 
to inform women’s experiences. As many scholars have elaborated, 
although violence is a common issue among women, it occurs within 
different contexts based on the woman’s race, class and other charac-
teristics.19 A pure gender-based conceptualization also fails accu-
rately to account for violence within lesbian and gay relationships.20 
 
 16. Id. at 1303. 
 17. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 67-68 (discussing traditional notions of 
heterosexual battering as “sexism”); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual 
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1188-1205 (1998) (discussing accounts of the equal-
ity or antisubordination principle in sexual harassment law).  
 18. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003), available at 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (concluding that 85% of all victimizations by inti-
mate partners in 2001 were against women). 
 19. For discussions of the complex interactions between gender, race, class, national-
ity, and sexuality, see SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 235-38, 267-81 
(1982); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1277 (1991); Nancy J. Knauer, 
Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While Risking Negative Stereo-
types, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325 (1999); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence 
Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differ-
entials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994). See generally DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE 
MARGINS (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt eds., 2005) (discussing the interactions be-
tween race, class, and gender). For additional sources, see SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 63 
n.10 (citing articles). 
 20. Although empirical evidence is sparse, researchers consistently report that do-
mestic violence occurs in approximately 25% of lesbian and gay relationships, approxi-
mately the same frequency as in heterosexual relationships. See Knauer, supra note 19, at 
328 nn.15-29 and accompanying text (citing and describing studies); see also CALLIE MARIE 
RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE AND AGE OF VICTIM, 1993-99, at 9 (2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipva99.pdf (reporting 10% of intimate partner victimi-
zations against men and 2% of intimate partner victimizations against women were com-
mitted in same-sex relationships); NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 2003 SUPPLEMENT, available at 
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/glbtdv/2003NCAVPdvrpt.pdf. For discussion of 
domestic violence in lesbian and gay relationships, see generally NAMING THE VIOLENCE: 
SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); CLAIRE M. RENZETTI, 
VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS (1992); SAME-SEX 
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Although this insight is no longer novel, it is worthy of repeating in 
any discussion equating domestic and sexual violence with gender-
discrimination. As a result, although deeming domestic and sexual 
violence unequivocally “gender-based” is important rhetorically, plac-
ing the problem in a social, rather than personal, context, it inade-
quately reflects the full realities of women’s experiences with abuse.  
 Others have critiqued the discrimination connection through ar-
guments that there are different types of sexual violence, not all of 
which are informed by sex-based inequality. For example, Michael 
Johnson and Kathleen Ferraro have identified four patterns of part-
ner violence: common couple violence, intimate terrorism, violent re-
sistance, and mutual violent control.21 Under this framework, the 
category “intimate terrorism” most directly recognizes the role of sex 
discrimination.22 Johnson’s research offers a framework for recogniz-
ing the link between domestic and sexual violence and sex discrimi-
nation while also contemplating that some individual instances of 
domestic and sexual violence may not fit the sex discrimination 
paradigm. This approach leaves room for battered women’s reports 
of their experiences, which often describe the violence in their lives 
as a problem of personality, or relationship, rather than as a prob-
lem of discrimination.23  
 Some principles central to feminist law reform support viewing 
the generalization skeptically. For example, feminists long have 
fought against restrictive stereotypes, which presumably would in-
clude stereotypes that women are passive and incapable of, or at 
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (Beth Leventhal & Sandra E. Lundy, eds., 
1999); VIOLENCE IN GAY AND LESBIAN DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (Claire M. Renzetti & 
Charles Harvey Miley eds., 1996); Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: 
Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law 
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990). 
 21. Michael P. Johnson & Kathleen J. Ferraro, Research on Domestic Violence in the 
1990s: Making Distinctions, 62 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 948, 949-50 (2000). Under this 
framework, “common couple violence” arises in the context of a specific argument that 
leads one or both partners to lash out at the other. Id. at 949. “Intimate terrorism” is char-
acterized by one partner’s efforts to exert control over the other. Id. This type of violence 
tends “to escalate over time, is less likely to be mutual, and is more likely to involve seri-
ous injury.” Id. “Violent resistance” refers to violence committed in self defense. Id. “Mu-
tual violent control” involves rare situations “in which both husband and wife are control-
ling and violent.” Id. at 950. This account is not inconsistent with the framework advanced 
by Dempsey, who, drawing on sociological literature, defines domestic violence in terms of 
three elements: violence, domesticity and structural inequality. See Michelle M. Dempsey, 
What Counts as Domestic Violence? A Conceptual Analysis, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
301, 307 (2006). 
 22. According to Johnson and Ferraro’s research, intimate terrorism is almost en-
tirely a male pattern of behavior. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 21, at 952. 
 23. See infra Part IV.B (discussing studies examining victims’ experience of abuse). 
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least not likely to commit, violence.24 Constitutional sex discrimina-
tion jurisprudence has helped dismantle stereotypes by recognizing 
the equality rights of those that defy stereotypes, suggesting that we 
take the “exceptional” cases seriously as well.25
 Critics from a different perspective argue that men, rather than 
women, are the invisible victims of intimate partner violence and 
that their needs are underserved by our current legal and social ser-
vices responses.26 Of course, some men are the victims of violence. 
Some are abused in same-sex relationships.27 Others may in fact be 
abused by women.28 Nevertheless, the data confirm that women, not 
 
 24. See, e.g., Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black 
Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 196-98 (1991) (criticizing stereotypes of 
battered women as excluding African-American women); Linda L. Ammons, Mules, 
Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American 
Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1070-71 (1995) (argu-
ing that stereotypes of battered women who kill their abusive partners as passive, emo-
tional, and dependent create problems for battered African-American women who are not 
seen as fitting that stereotype); Rivera, supra note 19, at 240-42 (challenging stereotypes of 
battered women as inconsistent with stereotypes of Latinas); Elizabeth M. Schneider, De-
scribing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony 
on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 214-15 (1986) (criticizing “battered woman syn-
drome” as reinforcing stereotypes of women as passive); see also Francisco Valdes, Queers, 
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual 
Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 334 (1995) (discussing 
stereotype of women as passive). For discussions of the statistics reflecting women’s in-
volvement in crime and a review of the theories explaining women’s violence, see NAT’L 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN & GIRLS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2006), www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/wgcjs/summary.html (summa-
rizing statistics); Cheryl Hanna, Ganging Up on Girls: Young Women and Their Emerging 
Violence, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 93, 104-21 (1999); Monica Pa, Towards a Feminist Theory of Vio-
lence, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 45, 48-62 (2002). 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (noting that “[sex] 
classifications may not be used . . . to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women”); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (hold-
ing that an all-female nursing school violated the equal protection clause by perpetuating 
stereotyped notions about women’s appropriate roles and abilities); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (criticizing “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the 
sexes” that limit women’s choices). 
 26. See, e.g., Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing for lack of 
standing challenge to Minnesota statutes authorizing funds for domestic violence victims 
as discriminating against men); Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 474, 
482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), review denied, No. S132188, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 4617 (Cal. Apr. 27, 
2005) (dismissing allegation that domestic violence shelter discriminated against alleged 
battered husband for lack of standing); Hagemann v. Stanek, No. A03-2045, 2004 Minn. 
App. LEXIS 789 (Minn. Ct. App. July 13, 2004) (same). For a general discussion of claims 
by fathers’ rights groups as they relate to domestic violence law reform and advocacy, see 
Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Vio-
lence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1697-1702, 1709-10 (2004). 
 27. See supra note 20 for various studies on domestic violence among same-sex couples. 
 28. Although some women no doubt are violent, studies indicate that most instances 
in which a woman is violent in an intimate relationship are cases that do not involve the 
patterns of coercion and control generally associated with what we call “domestic” or “inti-
mate partner” violence. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 21, at 949-58. Most cases involving 
violence by women in cases involving that type of coercion and control were cases in which 
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men, overwhelmingly are the victims of domestic and sexual vio-
lence.29 To account for both the overwhelming majority of cases, as 
well as the exceptions, a conception of domestic and sexual violence 
that recognizes the social context that renders it deeply gendered in 
a general sense, but allows room for individual cases that may fall 
outside that model, more accurately describes the problem. 
B.   Addressing Discrimination Through a Civil Rights Approach 
 The theoretical link between domestic and sexual violence and sex 
discrimination has expanded civil accountability in a number of con-
texts.30 Building on arguments that led to the recognition that sexual 
harassment in the workplace is a form of sex discrimination,31 advo-
cates sought to establish domestic and sexual violence as a civil 
rights violation. After four years of hearings to document the wide-
spread harms of domestic and sexual violence, its impact on the na-
tional economy, and states’ inability to address the problem without 
federal assistance, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women 
Act in 1994.32 One of that comprehensive law’s most significant and 
controversial provisions was a civil rights remedy that declared that 
gender-motivated violence violates victims’ civil rights. This civil 
rights remedy entitled a victim to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages from the perpetrator, to obtain declaratory and injunctive 
relief, and to recover attorney’s fees.33 The provision was seen as in-
corporating the antidiscrimination theory urged by many feminists. 
For example, MacKinnon argued that the civil rights remedy would 
reflect “ground-up” theory transformed into practice so that a woman’s 
claim of sexual violence would authoritatively be recognized as “inequal-
ity on the basis of sex” and a violation of women’s human rights.34  
 
the woman used violence in self-defense. Id. Thus, while I acknowledge the theoretical pos-
sibility that women are violent, the data shows that the type of violence used is different in 
kind from that associated with the common term “domestic abuse.” 
 29. See Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 21, at 952. 
 30. See infra Part III.  
 31. For examples of these arguments, see LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). 
 32. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 
(codified in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 33. The 1994 VAWA was comprehensive legislation that contained dozens of provi-
sions designed to enhance legal remedies, improve law enforcement response, enhance vic-
tim services, and reduce violence against women. Id. VAWA since has been twice reautho-
rized and enhanced with provisions that would better serve victim needs. See Violence 
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1491. The civil rights remedy on which this Article focuses was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
13981 (2000) and was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000). 
 34. MacKinnon, supra note 12, at 691. 
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 The civil rights remedy’s history has been well documented.35 
During the four-year period preceding its enactment, supporters and 
opponents debated the appropriate scope of the law, addressing con-
cerns that federal courts should not concern themselves with family 
law disputes.36 The remedy’s scope has been described as the most 
controversial aspect of the 1994 VAWA.37 Through hearings and con-
gressional negotiations, the legislative proposals carefully were 
amended to exclude traditional family law issues and to be limited to 
those matters that could be categorized as “civil rights” violations 
and therefore deemed appropriate for federal court adjudication.38 
 
 35. For accounts of VAWA’s legislative history, see Sally Goldfarb, Remarks at a 
Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Sept. 
14, 1995), in 4 J.L. & POL’Y 391, 392-95 (1996); Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Rela-
tionship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996).   
 36. Goldfarb, supra note 35, at 393. 
 37. See Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 7; accord Nourse, supra note 35, at 5 (describing 
the civil rights remedy as “unprecedented” and recounting its attendant controversy). Al-
though much of the controversy derived from objections to expanded federal civil rights 
legislation and the equation of domestic and sexual violence with discriminatory harms 
suitable for adjudication in federal court, other critiques were grounded in concerns about 
the law’s efficacy for all women. For example, some argued that it would not be used by 
women of color, who would be less inclined to commence engagement with the civil or 
criminal justice system for a variety of reasons. See Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against 
Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Femi-
nist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 463, 497-501 (1996) (arguing that limited access to the legal 
system, the diminished expectation among women of color of receiving justice due to his-
torically discriminatory treatment, minimal likelihood of obtaining satisfactory relief due 
to defendants’ limited assets, and lack of attorneys would limit the civil rights remedy’s ef-
fectiveness for women of color); see also Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Bat-
tered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. 1, 106 (1992) (cautioning that VAWA’s 
civil rights remedy “risks creation of images that essentialize gender categories and fail to 
give weight to differences of race, class, sexual orientation and different preference for sex-
ual pleasures”); David Frazee, An Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construc-
tion of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 232 
(1993) (arguing that VAWA’s civil rights remedy would “disproportionately burden men of 
color, while providing an inadequate remedy for women of color”); Sara E. Lesch, A Trou-
bled Inheritance: An Examination of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act in Light of 
Current Critiques of Civil Rights Law, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 535, 539-49 (1993) (cri-
tiquing VAWA civil rights remedy’s inability to address claims of plaintiffs who fall into 
more than one category that the law protects from discrimination, such as persons who are 
both females and persons of color). 
 38. For example, early drafts of the federal civil rights remedy would have treated all 
acts of “ ‘rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact’ “ as satisfying the statutory stan-
dard. Nourse, supra note 35, at 7 (quoting S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(c)). The language 
Congress eventually adopted, in combination with statements that constituted part of the 
Act’s legislative history, effectively required plaintiffs to submit proof of circumstantial 
evidence beyond evidence of an act or acts of domestic or sexual violence alone. See id. at 
14-15 (describing statutory provision); Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Devel-
oping a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 123, 
129-30, 142-48 (1999) (discussing the gender-motivation element and the realities of the 
application of facts to that element). Some have criticized the statutory formulation for re-
jecting that definitional equation. See, e.g., Brenneke, supra note 37, at 94-97 (urging 
statutory designation of domestic violence as per se statutory violation); Birgit Schmidt am 
Busch, Domestic Violence and Title III of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Femi-
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Thus, the law as enacted required that plaintiffs establish that an 
act of violence was a “crime of violence” as defined by federal law39 
and that it was “motivated by gender” under a statutory definition 
that required that the act be committed “because of or on the basis of 
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s 
gender.”40 Accordingly, acts that were, as cosponsor Senator Biden 
stated, “ordinary” acts of domestic violence would not come within 
the statute’s reach.41 
 The controversy that surrounded the law continued once it was in 
effect, but on a somewhat different course. Rather than focusing on 
the meaning and interpretation of the statutory terms, the law be-
came mired in constitutional controversy and ultimately was struck 
down as unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison.42 Once joined, 
disputes over the law’s constitutionality and the appropriate reach of 
federal legislative power took center stage in discourse about the 
remedy. The Morrison decision, which announced the Court’s current 
view of the scope of federal power with respect to domestic and sex-
 
nist Critique, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9-26 (1995) (critiquing the narrow definition of a 
“crime of violence” and the gender-motivation requirement); Frazee, supra note 37, at 242-
43 (endorsing statutory enumeration of violations, including rape, sexual assault, and do-
mestic violence as per se gender motivated); Jennifer Gaffney, Amending the Violence 
Against Women Act: Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 
6 J.L. & POL’Y 247, 249 (1997) (arguing that Congress should amend VAWA’s civil rights 
provision to create “a rebuttable presumption of gender animus in all rape cases”); Sally F. 
Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: Some Reflections 
on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 251, 261-69 (2003) (assessing 
strengths and weaknesses of the discrimination model); Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun Is Al-
ways Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 
2197, 2216-22 (1992) (advocating the rebuttable presumption that all sexual assaults are 
gender-motivated). Nevertheless, the resulting statutory language did not preclude courts 
from presuming acts of rape or domestic violence to be discriminatory without any further 
proof, and some federal and state courts did just that. See Julie Goldscheid & Risa E. 
Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Crimes—Charting New Ground in Familiar 
Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 265, 273-83 (2001) (discussing the concept of gender 
bias in domestic violence and sexual assault cases).  
 39. Nourse, supra note 35, at 14-15, 28, 36. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)-(c) (2000). 
 41. See S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 69 (1991) (statement of Senator Biden). 
 42. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In many ways, the civil rights remedy’s enactment one year 
before the Supreme Court’s historic decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 
(1995) (striking the Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause au-
thority) determined the law’s history. Civil rights remedy litigation became mired in the 
debates over the scope of federal power that came to define the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., 
Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 134-42 (2001) (describing resurgence of federalism theo-
ries); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 146-47 (2001) (same). For discussion of the Court’s shift-
ing federalism jurisprudence, see Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States 
v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 793 (1996); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Lim-
its, but as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1221-25 (1997); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
2180, 2186-95 (1998).  
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ual violence, has been widely critiqued.43 Nevertheless, because the 
sole issue before the Court was Congress’ authority to enact the law, 
the decision neither resolved nor addressed a large category of con-
cerns that led to the law’s enactment: the importance of framing the 
harm that flows from domestic and sexual violence as a civil rights 
violation and of ensuring victims a remedy for the resulting harms. 
Those arguments accordingly bear revisiting and re-evaluation. 
 The civil rights remedy’s goals can be thought of in two categories: 
practical and symbolic.44 As a practical matter, the civil rights rem-
edy was designed to fill gaps in existing laws that prevented recovery 
and to enable victims to obtain financial and other forms of recovery 
for the harms they suffered as a result of abuse. Although then-
existing civil rights laws provided a cause of action against domestic 
and sexual violence when committed by state actors,45 committed by 
two or more individuals,46 or committed at work,47 no federal law pro-
vided a civil cause of action when the act was committed by a private 
individual at home or in other non-employment-related locations. 
Cramped interpretations of those existing statutes further limited 
recovery.48 Although numerous states provided civil remedies as part 
of their bias crime statutes49 and tort remedies theoretically could 
provide a means of recovery, many states’ interspousal immunity 
laws barred civil suits between married partners; some limitations 
 
 43. For commentary on the civil rights remedy and the impact of the Morrison deci-
sion, see SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 181-82 (2000); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, 
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 111-15 (2002); Goldfarb, supra note 38, at 258; 
Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and 
Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 109-24 (2002) [hereinafter Goldfarb, Use and 
Abuse]; Sally F. Goldfarb, “No Civilized System of Justice”: The Fate of the Violence Against 
Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 543-45 (2000) [hereinafter Goldfarb, No Civilized Sys-
tem]; Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 109, 135-38 (2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sover-
eignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135-37 (2000); Robert C. Post 
& Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After 
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 473-509 (2000); Judith Resnik, Categorical Feder-
alism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 626-29 (2001).   
 44. Some questioned the law’s utility and reach based on concerns that crossed these 
categories. For example, some argued that it would not be used by women of color who 
would be less inclined to commence engagement with the civil or criminal justice system 
for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Rivera, supra note 37, at 497-501 (arguing that limited 
access to the legal system, diminished expectation of receiving justice due to historic dis-
criminatory treatment, minimal likelihood of obtaining satisfactory relief due to defen-
dants’ limited assets, and lack of attorneys would particularly limit the civil rights rem-
edy’s effectiveness for women of color). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000). 
 47. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 48. See infra Part III.A. 
 49. For discussion of the case law under those state statutes, see Julie Goldscheid, 
The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not 
Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165-71 (2005). 
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applied to suits between unmarried intimate partners as well.50 In 
addition to those formal barriers to recovery, informal biases in the 
civil justice system operated to preclude suits.51 Even though some 
progress has been made since the law was introduced in 1990, many 
of these gaps and biases remain. 
 In addition to filling gaps in then-existing laws,52 the civil rights 
remedy offered practical advantages to traditional tort remedies—
such as longer statutes of limitations than what would be provided 
under other civil recovery theories53 and access to a federal forum, in 
which judges presumably were more accustomed to adjudicating dis-
crimination claims.54 The provision brought claims under the civil 
rights remedy into the category of claims for which successful plain-
tiffs could recover attorney’s fees, reflecting the goal of facilitating 
access to counsel for victims who historically have faced formidable 
barriers in accessing legal representation.55
 Other of the law’s goals can be seen as symbolic. Supporters 
touted the need for a national standard as a way of recognizing the 
widespread nature of the problem.56 As one commentator recently 
opined, the law “had enormous promise to further equal protection 
for women.”57 Scholars asserted that it would show how gender-
motivated violence violated our “ ‘commonly shared ideal of equality.’ 
”58 They also argued that, framed as a civil rights violation, these 
claims held greater potential to counteract damaging, stereotypical 
beliefs about women’s role in the violence59 and to change state ac-
tors’ attitudes and responses to the problem.60 This argument is con-
 
 50. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 42, 47, 55 (1993) (summarizing laws); see also Raisen 
v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979) (wife barred from suing husband for personal in-
jury); In re Marriage of Lacey, 659 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
 51. For legislative history recounting these biases, see H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 
(1994) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 44-46, 49 (1993); see also Nourse, supra note 
35, at 10. 
 52. See MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 137. 
 53. See Goldfarb, No Civilized System, supra note 43, at 539.
 54. Id. at 507.  
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (including the VAWA civil rights remedy, 42 U.S.C. § 
13981, as one of the statutes giving rise to recovery of attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs). 
 56. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that crime against women is wide-
spread); Goldfarb, Use and Abuse, supra note 43, at 108 (stating that the remedy helped 
secure women’s rights “in the face of widespread discrimination by the states”); Goldfarb, 
supra note 38, at 255 (“VAWA’s civil rights remedy emphasized that gender-motivated vio-
lence is a systemic, political problem and therefore requires a systemic, political solution.”).  
 57. Kristen Lombardi, Rape: Now a Matter of Civil Rights, a Crime Against Gender Is 
a Crime Against Freedom, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0603,lombardi,71765,5.html (quoting Diane Rosenfeld). 
 58. Goldfarb, Use and Abuse, supra note 43, at 82 (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 38 
(1993)); accord MacKinnon, supra note 12, at 691. 
 59. Goldfarb, No Civilized System, supra note 43, at 509.   
 60. Goldfarb, Use and Abuse, supra note 43, at 81.  
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sistent with the norm-setting value generally associated with civil 
rights claims.61
 By framing domestic and sexual violence as a form of sex dis-
crimination, the law sought to remedy the various ways sex dis-
crimination manifests in the context of the abuse. By holding indi-
viduals accountable for their actions it sought to address sex dis-
crimination by individual perpetrators. By providing an alternative 
to traditional criminal justice proceedings and a remedy that the vic-
tim—rather than a prosecutor—would control, it sought to redress 
the effects of institutional sex discrimination that tainted victims’ 
experience with law enforcement and criminal prosecutions. By re-
naming and reframing the problem, the remedy was intended to pro-
duce more comprehensive and transformative relief. 
III.   SEX-BASED CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES AND PRACTICAL AND 
TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE. 
A.   Practical Solutions and Theories of Recovery 
 This Section tests the limits of the claim that existing civil rights 
laws leave domestic and sexual violence victims without adequate 
redress. A careful review of the caselaw demonstrates that tradi-
tional civil rights statutes have provided some measure of redress for 
victims bringing claims against institutions but that those laws gen-
erally fail to hold individuals accountable for their abuse. However, 
particularly in the case of institutional accountability, cramped in-
terpretations of available laws limit recovery and render those doc-
trines worthy of re-examination and reform. The Section also shows 
that existing remedies holding individuals accountable for gender-
motivated violence as a civil rights violation are rarely used as a tool 
for redress. In Part IV, I discuss what that caselaw, or the lack 
thereof, indicates about the utility of civil rights claims as a source of 
redress for victims of gender-motivated violence and abuse.    
1.   Title VII and Employment Discrimination Laws 
 Antidiscrimination laws have produced significant inroads in 
holding institutions liable for domestic and sexual violence. Most no-
tably, arguments that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimina-
 
 61. This view of civil rights claims is consistent with the ways social movement theo-
rists have categorized the utility of the law in promoting social change. See Idit Kostiner, 
Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social Change, 
37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 323, 324 (2003) (categorizing the role of law in social change as instru-
mental (using law to procure “concrete resources such as jobs, health care, and quality 
education”); political (advancing empowerment, unity, and political mobilization of mar-
ginalized people); and cultural (emphasizing the need to transform society’s assumptions 
about marginalized people)); see also infra Part III.B. 
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tion have had tremendous impact on law and policy.62 Accordingly, 
rape or sexual assault in the workplace or at school may violate the 
victim’s equality rights.63 Sexual harassment laws cover sexual vio-
lence regardless of whether the act was committed by a supervisor or 
agent64 or by a coworker or a nonemployee such as a customer, pro-
vided that the harassment involved the workplace and that the em-
ployer knew or should have known of the abuse and failed to take 
prompt and appropriate remedial action.65 Because sexual harass-
ment laws apply to all employees, regardless of the relationship be-
tween the perpetrator and the victim, these laws apply to sexual vio-
lence within intimate relationships as well. As a result, employers 
may be liable for sexual harassment when an intimate partner 
abuses his partner at work.66  
 By defining unwanted sexual behavior and other conduct that re-
inscribes sexual stereotypes as sex discrimination, sexual harass-
 
 62. For discussions of the history of sexual harassment law, see Katherine M. Franke, 
What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 698-705 (1997); Reva B. 
Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 1, 1-42 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); Abrams, 
supra note 17, at 1173-94; Vicki Schultz; Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1683, 1692-1710 (1998). 
 63. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (upholding 
liability for sexual harassment when supervisor sexually assaulted employee). This is true 
both in the workplace and in schools. See Doe v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 
57, 62 (D. Me. 1999) (school district may be liable for sexual assault in school). 
 64. See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1999) (single incident 
of sexual assault would constitute impermissible sexual harassment); Brock v. United 
States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “every rape committed in the em-
ployment setting is also discrimination based on the employee’s sex”); Jones v. U.S. Gyp-
sum, 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1695 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (upholding sexual harassment 
claim based on assault in genital area and citing cases). 
 65. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 964, 968 (9th Cir. 
2002) (employer may be liable for harassment by failing to act after one of its employees 
reported being raped by a client); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012, 114-16 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (sexual harassment laws applied where female employees were subjected to un-
wanted touching and offensive comments by coworkers); Menchaca v. Rose Records, Inc., 
67 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (employer is not shielded from liability 
where the harasser is a customer “if the employer knew or should have known of the har-
assment”); Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, No. 92-2701, 1994 WL 394855, at *6 (D.P.R. July 
20, 1994) (acknowledging potential employer liability for sexual harassment by client); Otis 
v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 WL 566943, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (employer may 
be responsible for alleged harassment by an independent contractor); Powell v. Las Ve-
gas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Nev. 1992) (hotel employer could be held 
liable for sexual harassment of employees by customer); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)-
(e) (2006) (EEOC guidelines confirming employers’ liability for sexual harassment by 
coworkers and customers).  
 66. See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1525-27, 1529 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(reversing trial judge’s decision and holding city liable for failing to take steps to stop a po-
lice officer from harassing another officer after she ended their relationship); see also Excel 
Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 637, 641 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming an employee’s sexual 
harassment claim against an employer where employer failed to take action after receiving 
complaints by employee that her ex-husband, a coworker, was harassing her at work). 
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ment law both has expanded the range of practical remedies for those 
subjected to conduct that includes domestic and sexual violence and 
has gone some distance towards transforming public perceptions of 
the problem. Although it correctly has been criticized as falling short 
of the goal of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace, it 
has made significant inroads in changing the limits of acceptable 
conduct at work.67
 In contrast to the impact antidiscrimination laws have had in 
holding institutions liable, laws such as Title VII have had limited ef-
fect in holding individuals liable for domestic or sexual violence at 
work. Most courts addressing the question have rejected individual 
liability for sexual harassment under Title VII, based on interpreta-
tions of the statutory language defining “employer” as entities with 
fifteen or more employees (under Title VII) and those with twenty or 
more employees (under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) 
as indicating congressional intent to preclude individual liability.68 
Although a few courts have ruled that the federal antidiscrimination 
laws contemplate individual liability,69 Title VII currently stands as 
a limited remedy for those seeking to hold individuals, as opposed to 
institutions, liable for domestic and sexual violence when it affects a 
survivors’ employment.70  
 
 67. See infra notes 116-31 and accompanying text for a more detailed description of 
sexual harassment law’s impact on workplace policy and behaviors. 
 68. See, e.g., Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 406 (6th Cir. 1997) (Title VII 
precludes individual liability); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(same); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Williams v. Ban-
ning, 72 F.3d 552, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); see also Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 
1504 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals cannot be sued in their individual capaci-
ties under Title VII); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech. Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(same); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 
21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 
(9th Cir. 1993) (same).  
 69. See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding indi-
vidual liability when a supervisor “exercises significant control over the plaintiff’s hiring, 
firing or conditions of employment”), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Dreisbach v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (super-
visor can be liable under Title VII as an agent of the employer); see also Iacampo v. Hasbro, 
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 572 (D.R.I. 1996) (supervisors may be individually liable); Douglas 
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N. England, 855 F. Supp. 518, 520 (D.N.H. 1994) (finding indi-
vidual liability for agents of an employer); Weeks v. Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Me. 
1994) (supervisors may be individually liable). Notably, these last cases are within the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals, which has declined to rule on the issue. See Serapion v. 
Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1997).  
 70. Victims of domestic or sexual violence may fare better under state antidiscrimina-
tion laws. See generally Shannon Clark Kief, Annotation, Individual Liability of Supervi-
sors, Managers, Officers or Co-Employees for Discriminatory Actions Under State Civil 
Rights Act, 83 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2000) (discussing cases). 
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2.   42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§ 1983)71 can provide re-
lief for domestic and sexual violence victims under certain circum-
stances, such as when sexual assaults are committed by state actors 
or committed in public institutions such as prisons or schools. The 
prevalence of abuse in those settings renders this remedy tragically 
important.72 Section 1983 also has been the basis for claims holding 
public institutions accountable for inadequately responding to abuse. 
Despite the theoretical possibility of recovery, judicial interpretation 
has rendered relief extremely limited, if not unavailable outright. 
Claims by victims of sexual assault against perpetrators who are 
state actors generally rest on substantive due process or cruel and 
inhuman punishment arguments rather than on claims of sex dis-
crimination. Judicial reliance on those constitutional foundations has 
led to decisions distinguishing sexual assaults that are deemed suffi-
ciently severe to violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interest 
in bodily integrity or the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment from those that do not. Accordingly, perpe-
trators have been held liable in cases involving fairly egregious as-
saults—for example, when police officers raped women during traffic 
 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007). That statute provides a remedy for those whose federal 
rights have been violated by individuals acting under color of state law. Id. 
 72. A recent government study of sexual violence in prisons reported 8210 allegations 
of sexual violence in 2004. ALLEN J. BECK & TIMOTHY A. HUGHES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2004, at 1 tbl.1 (2005), 
available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/svrca04.pdf. Other studies find higher rates of 
abuse. See CARL WEISS & DAVID JAMES FRIAR, TERROR IN THE PRISONS: HOMOSEXUAL RAPE 
AND WHY SOCIETY CONDONES IT 61 (1974) (predicting that 10 million of the 46 million 
Americans who are arrested at some point in their lives will be raped in prison); Cindy 
Struckman-Johnson & David Struckman-Johnson, Sexual Coercion Reported by Women in 
Three Midwestern Prisons, 39 J. SEX RES. 217, 217 (2002) (conducting a study of three 
midwestern prisons and finding that the inmates in “Facility 1” reported that 27% had 
been coerced in the state system and 19% in their present facility, while the inmates in 
“Facility 2” and “Facility 3” reported that 8 to 9% had been coerced in the state system and 
6 to 8 % in their present facility). Studies show that the number of women in state and fed-
eral prisons increased over 500% between 1980 and the end of 1998. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WOMEN IN PRISON: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES CONFRONTING U.S. 
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS 2 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-00-22. Other reports conclude that these statistics likely underesti-
mate the problem because rape in prison is chronically underreported. See HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, at pt. 7 (2002), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report7.html#_1_44. Sexual assault also is com-
monly committed at school, often by school officials. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. 
FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING, TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 
22-23 figs.11 & 12 (2001) available at http://www.aauw.org/member_center/publications/ 
HostileHallways/hostilehallways.pdf (reporting that 20% of secondary school boys and 29% 
of secondary school girls experienced unwanted sexual touching, grabbing, or pinching). 
Other studies similarly report high level of unwanted sexual violence in schools. See NAN 
STEIN, INCIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 
K–12 SCHOOLS (1999), available at http://www.sexcriminals.com/library/doc-1082-1.pdf 
(discussing various surveys).  
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stops,73 when a supervisor in a work program for inmates repeatedly 
subjected a woman to unwanted sexual acts,74 when a prison guard 
raped an inmate,75 or when a teacher sexually assaulted a student.76 
This approach leaves others who may have suffered harm without 
redress.77  
 Section 1983 also has been the basis for municipal liability claims 
arising from public institutions’ inadequate response to cases of do-
mestic or sexual violence. In cases involving sexual abuse in public 
facilities, the doctrinally constrained approach to municipal liability 
often leaves victims without a remedy.78 Although some institutions 
have been held liable for their failed response to abuse,79 judicial def-
 
 73. See, e.g., Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 793-94, 797 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(officer violated substantive due process when he stopped driver who had a broken tail 
light, called for a tow truck, then cancelled the tow, followed her home, went into her 
house, and raped her); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (officer violated 
victim’s due process right to bodily integrity where after giving the victim a warning for an 
alleged traffic defense, the officer raped her before he drove her home); Haberthur v. City 
of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 1997) (sexual assault by police officer violated 
plaintiff’s substantive due process rights). 
 74. Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that sexual abuse 
of a prisoner by a corrections officer implicates the Eighth Amendment). 
 75. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that rape 
of transgendered prisoner violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and in-
human punishment). 
 76. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) (student 
sexually assaulted by high school teacher). 
 77. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2003) (sheriff liable 
for fondling a female employee’s breast but not for touching a male employee’s “sensitive” 
areas); Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1074-76 (8th Cir. 1998) (civilian maintenance 
workers’ sexual touching of male inmate deemed inappropriate “horse play” that did not 
give rise to a federal cause of action); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(affirming lower court’s decision that male inmate’s vague and minor Eighth Amendment 
claims for sexual abuse did not raise a cognizable cause of action). Notably, a number of 
these cases were brought on behalf of male inmates. These cases may well reflect judicial 
reluctance to recognize the severity of harm resulting from sexual assaults of men. 
 78. See Will A. Smith, Civil Liability for Sexual Assault in Prison: A Challenge to the 
“Deliberate Indifference” Standard, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 289, 305 (2004) (stating that “pris-
oner assault often goes unnoticed outside prison walls, leaving the victim without remedy, 
notwithstanding established legal protections”). 
 79. In cases against prisons, for example, prison authorities have been held liable for 
their failure to address rampant sexual abuse of female prisoners when plaintiffs could es-
tablish that the authorities acted with deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Riley v. Olk-Long, 
282 F.3d 592, 595 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that inmate was sexually assaulted and that 
agent of prison knew of perpetrator’s past history of sexual assaults); Daskalea v. District 
of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 
883 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding municipality was deliberately indifferent when prison officials 
failed adequately to discipline corrections officer for five-month span of sexual misconduct). 
For a more complete discussion of the history of claims against the D.C. Department of 
Corrections for its failure to address rampant sexual abuse, see Women Prisoners of the 
D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 914-15 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
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erence to law enforcement dooms claims where courts can point to 
some minimal disciplinary response.80  
 Municipal liability under § 1983 played a historically important 
role in improving police responses to domestic violence.81 Law en-
forcement policies changed substantially after battered women or 
their surviving families held police departments accountable for re-
sponses such as ignoring calls asking for police intervention or for 
assuring battered women that the police had the batterer in custody, 
and the batterer subsequently harmed the woman or her family.82 
These claims have been based on equal protection, substantive due 
process, and procedural due process theories. Although these claims 
met with some success when initially brought, they increasingly have 
become difficult to sustain. For example, facially neutral policies 
treating domestic violence calls differently than other similar calls, 
have been found to have a disproportionate impact on women83 and 
to violate equal protection when implemented with discriminatory 
intent.84 But the stiff burden of establishing discriminatory intent 
has made recovery under that theory increasingly difficult.85  
 
 80. See Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no municipal 
liability in case alleging sexual assault by officer where police department allowed the offi-
cer—who, in previous incident, allegedly had used his badge to gain entry to a citizen’s 
apartment and sexually assault her—to return to street duty); Rogers v. Little Rock, 152 
F.3d 790, 800 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding no municipal liability in claim of sexual assault by of-
ficer when department temporarily suspended him following previous claim of sexual as-
sault against him).  
 81. SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 44; Sack, supra note 26, at 1667-69. 
 82. SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 44; Sack, supra note 26, at 1667-69. 
 83. For example, a policy that treated domestic violence calls differently than other 
similar calls may have a disproportionate impact on women given that the vast majority 
of domestic violence claims concern violence committed by men against women. See su-
pra note 18. 
 84. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990) (recount-
ing police officer’s statement that he “ ‘did not blame the plaintiff’s husband for hitting her, 
because of the way she was “carrying on” ’ ”); Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 
(10th Cir. 1988) (holding that evidence of “a policy or custom of affording less protection to 
victims of domestic violence than victims of non-domestic attacks” could reflect discrimina-
tory motive); Smith v. City of Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (allowing 
equal protection claim to proceed based on evidence, for example, of a written policy urging 
officers not to arrest a man for domestic violence in his home because female complainants 
are often irrational and because the loss of the arrested man’s wages is detrimental to the 
children); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528-29 (D. Conn. 1984) 
(holding police policy urging reconciliation rather than arrest reflects outdated stereotypes 
and denies equal protection of the laws). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found 
similar policies to violate even rational basis review. See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 
717 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 85. See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781-82 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding 
policy of fewer arrests in domestic abuse cases than nondomestic cases could be rationally 
explained by “inherent differences” between those cases and rejecting circumstantial evi-
dence of officers’ statements about not arresting batterers as “unreliable hearsay” and in-
sufficient to establish discriminatory animus toward women); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 
865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim due to lack of evidence beyond statistical evidence 
of low arrest rates in domestic violence cases); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 
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 Substantive due process arguments have provided relief in cases 
in which survivors have established that police policies affirmatively 
put the victim in a more dangerous position that subsequently led to 
her or her family being harmed by an abusive partner.86 But courts 
have construed this theory narrowly as well, even when presented 
with facts reflecting tragic law enforcement neglect.87 Turning to the 
third available theory, the Supreme Court recently rejected a proce-
dural due process argument that a police department’s failure to en-
force a protective order denied without due process the property in-
terest that a domestic violence victim held in the enforcement of the 
order.88 Together, these cases reflect both the importance of institu-
tional accountability and the difficulty of establishing a claim under 
current frameworks. 
3.   42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
 The Reconstruction-Era statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), prohibits 
conspiracies to deprive any person or “class of persons” equal protec-
tion of the laws.89 As a practical matter, this will not impact the vast 
majority of domestic and sexual violence claims, which overwhelm-
ingly are committed by lone private individuals.90 After the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decisions in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
 
416 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding insufficient evidence of a police department’s policy of treating 
domestic violence victims differently than other similarly situated victims).  
 86. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200-01 
(1989) (recognizing that municipalities may be liable under state-created danger theory); 
see also Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that police may be 
liable if they took affirmative actions that increased the danger of domestic violence be-
yond what it would be absent state action); Smith v. City of Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203, 
1210 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (concluding that police increased danger to battered woman when 
they told her they could not interfere in domestic dispute notwithstanding history of vio-
lence and abuse and when her former husband subsequently killed her); Caitlin E. Borg-
mann, Battered Women’s Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect 
DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280, 1283 (1990) (arguing that a state’s failure to enforce 
protective orders gives rise to a valid cause of action); cf. Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 440 
F.3d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the court’s deci-
sion to uphold the state-created danger theory when a police officer assured the mother of 
a sexually assaulted girl of their safety and then notified the assailant, who subsequently 
shot the mother and her husband).  
 87. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no due process 
violation when police officer, in response to a domestic disturbance in which plaintiff 
claimed her former boyfriend, who had just been released from prison, threatened to kill 
plaintiff and her children, assured plaintiff that her former boyfriend would by locked up 
overnight, but instead he was released that night, after which he returned to plaintiff’s 
home and set it on fire, causing the deaths of plaintiff’s children).  
 88. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000). 
 90. Compare, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.38 
(reporting 169,340 rapes or sexual assaults by single-offenders), with id. tbl.49 (re-
porting 29,500 rapes or sexual assaults by multiple-offenders), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus03.pdf. 
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Clinic91 and Griffin v. Breckenridge,92 claimants invoking § 1985(3) 
must establish that the defendants conspired to deprive a person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws and that the con-
spiracy was fueled by some “ ‘class-based, invidiously discriminatory 
animus.’ ”93 Although the Court in Bray concluded that antiabortion 
protests did not signal class- (that is, gender-) based animus, it did 
not preclude § 1985(3)’s applicability to attacks directed at women in 
other circumstances.94 Subsequent lower court decisions have held 
that conspiracies directed at a class of women could be actionable 
under § 1985(3).95 Other decisions have upheld claims based on alle-
gations of circumstantial evidence, such as the use of gendered epi-
thets.96 Thus, although theoretically available, § 1985(3) remains of 
limited use for victims of domestic and sexual violence, whether as a 
matter of equality or other theories of relief. 
4.   Bias-Motivated Violence Laws 
 Antidiscrimination statutes that authorize civil redress for domes-
tic and sexual violence as a form of sex discrimination most explicitly 
link the violence with historic discrimination. These laws, which I 
will loosely refer to as “civil rights remedies,” can be thought of as 
part of the category of “bias-motivated violence” laws that have been 
 
 91. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).  
 92. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
 93. Bray, 506 U.S. at 268 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102). 
 94. In Bray, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ claims that antiabortion protesters targeted 
women seeking abortions because they were women. The Court reasoned that opposition to 
voluntary abortion cannot be considered “such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or 
paternalism towards) women.” Bray, 507 U.S. at 270. Instead, the Court reasoned that 
“there are common and respectable reasons for opposing [abortion], other than hatred of, or 
condescension toward . . . women as a class.” Id.  The Court contrasted the record before it 
with other “assertedly benign (though objectively invidious), discrimination” against 
women that “focuses upon women by reason of their sex,” for example, “the purpose of “sav-
ing” women because they are women from a combative, aggressive profession such as the 
practice of law.” Id.  
 95. See, e.g., Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (rec-
ognizing women are a protected class under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) in claim alleging class-
based conspiracy in employment policies failing to promote women and collecting cases). 
 96. See, e.g., Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 449 (1st Cir. 1995) (evidence that anti-
abortion protesters directed epithets, such as calling prochoice women “ ‘lesbians’ ” 
and “ ‘drug addicts,’ ” reflected discriminatory animus); Jones v. Clinton, 974 F. Supp. 712, 
729 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim based on allegations that defen-
dants “ ‘reached an understanding’ ” to violate her equal protection rights in case of un-
wanted sexual harassment). But see Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 
1996) (finding no evidence of discriminatory animus in claim against police officer and 
other public officials when the officer sexually assaulted a young woman living at a resi-
dence to which the police were called); Valanzuela v. Snider, 889 F. Supp. 1409, 1420 (D. 
Colo. 1995) (recognizing that women can constitute a class protected under § 1985(3) but 
finding no evidence that defendants selected their actions because of their effect on women, 
in claim against police officer who abducted and repeatedly sexually assaulted woman af-
ter traffic stops).  
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on the books since at least 1987.97 The civil rights remedy of the 1994 
Violence Against Women Act98 attracted more public attention than 
any previous similar enactment.99 Through the VAWA civil rights 
remedy, Congress sought to provide a means of redress for victims of 
gender-motivated crime who otherwise might lack an adequate 
means of recovering damages.  
 The law afforded recovery to many of the victims who invoked it 
while it was in force. Commentators expressed concern that the 
statutory definitions established a prohibitively high threshold for 
recovery by requiring proof both that the act constituted a “crime of 
violence” and that it was “motivated by gender.”100 Nevertheless, 
courts readily recognized allegations of domestic and sexual violence 
as gender-motivated in the majority of cases brought under the law 
during its brief history.101  
 There are several possible explanations for the seeming ease with 
which courts concluded that allegations of domestic violence and 
sexual assault would meet the statutory “gender-motivation” re-
quirement. It may reflect federal judges’ familiarity with cases re-
quiring consideration of whether allegations of sexual harassment 
constituted discrimination based on sex.102 Judges’ experience with 
those cases may have facilitated their ability to draw an inference of 
 
 97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-1(a) (2004) (enacted in 1987). 
 98. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 
Stat. 1902, 1941-42 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)), invalidated by 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
 99. See Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media Treatment of VAWA’s 
Civil Rights Remedy, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327 (2003) (analyzing media treatment of the 
civil rights provision before and after the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)-(d). 
 101. See Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 38, at 273-83 (recounting cases interpret-
ing “gender motivation” requirement); cf. J. Rebekka S. Bonner, Reconceptualizing VAWA’s 
“Animus” for Rape in States’ Emerging Post-VAWA Civil Rights Legislation, 111 YALE L.J. 
1417, 1452-55 (2002) (recommending framework for analyzing gender-motivation under 
new civil rights remedies).  Notably, the “crime of violence” element proved to be somewhat 
more problematic, although even that formulation did not bar many claims. See Goldscheid 
& Kaufman, supra note 38, at 271 n.27 (summarizing cases interpreting “crime of violence” 
requirement). See generally Renée L. Jarusinsky, Gender Difference in Perceiving Violence 
and Its Implication for the VAWA’s Civil Rights Remedy, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 965, 975-
79, 988-94 (2000) (discussing statutory requirement).  
 102. Federal sexual harassment law and the VAWA civil rights remedy approached 
proof of gender discrimination differently, although both frameworks engage in essentially 
similar inquiries. Title VII requires, inter alia, that the conduct be committed “because 
of . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). By contrast, the VAWA civil rights remedy by 
statute required proof both that the conduct was committed “because of . . . or on the basis 
of gender” and that the conduct was committed “due . . . to an animus based on the victim’s 
gender.” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (emphasis added). The facial difference in the formula-
tions could have been interpreted to require more exacting proof of “gender-motivation” in 
VAWA civil rights remedy cases. However, courts evaluating VAWA civil rights remedy 
claims relied on the same type of circumstantial evidence used in other discrimination 
cases to evaluate the statutory element.  
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discrimination from allegations of domestic or sexual violence, even 
lacking additional circumstantial evidence of bias. It also may reflect 
the logical inference that underlies the feminist equation of domestic 
and sexual violence with sex discrimination. It may reflect the trans-
formative potential of laws like the civil rights remedy by requiring 
judges to consider and classify violence in the context of discrimina-
tion.103 On the other hand, it is entirely possible that judges would 
exact more careful scrutiny of the statutory language as the body of 
caselaw grew and as litigation centered more on the satisfaction of 
statutory elements than on the constitutionality of the federal law.104  
 In the aftermath of the Morrison opinion striking the law as un-
constitutional, California, Illinois, New York City, and Westchester 
County, New York, enacted civil rights remedies that were modeled 
after the federal law.105 Other than the jurisdictional restriction of a 
state versus a federal forum, these laws provide virtually identical 
substantive relief, with similar elements of proof, to that provided in 
the now-unavailable federal law.106 As such, at least as a theoretical 
matter, these laws should serve as a rough substitute for the VAWA 
civil rights remedy in the jurisdictions in which they have been en-
acted. Yet these statutes have received little public attention and do 
not yet appear to be widely used. To date, only one reported decision 
reflects a survivor’s attempt to use any of these new laws, and that 
 
 103. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2206 (1996) (observing that the “very struggle” over the civil rights 
remedy’s interpretation will “modernize gender status discourse”). 
 104. Litigation under the federal civil rights remedy while it was in force focused on 
the law’s constitutionality rather than on the meaning of the statutory elements. See gen-
erally Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 38, at 273 n.36 (reviewing cases). 
 105. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.4 (West 2004); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/10 (West 
2004); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-901 (2000); WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N.Y., LAWS OF 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY ch. 701 (2001). New York City’s City Council referenced the Morri-
son decision in its legislative findings and stated that it enacted this law “[i]n light of the 
void left by the Supreme Court’s decision” to ensure that victims had an “officially sanc-
tioned and legitimate cause of action for seeking redress for injuries resulting from gender-
motivated violence.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-902 (2000). Other states have introduced, but 
have not yet enacted, similar proposals. See, e.g., S.B. 1535, 44th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2000) (establishing civil liability for “crime of violence motivated by gender”); H.B. 1691, 
83rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2001) (proposing civil cause of action for “ ‘act of vio-
lence motivated by gender’ ”); A.B. 6636, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003-04); A.B. 
6380, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003-04) (proposing civil cause of action for victims of 
gender violence); H.B. 141, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004) (proposing civil 
cause of action for victims of criminal offenses committed at least in part based on the vic-
tim’s gender, including offenses that cause harm to the person’s “unborn”); H.B. 2057, 2003 
Leg. (Pa. 2003) (proposing civil cause of action for “crime of violence motivated by gender”); 
S.B. 403, 2003 Leg. (Pa. 2003) (same).   
 106. For a discussion of the differences between federal and state fora, see Burt Neub-
orne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 
799-800 (1995) (discussing advantages of federal versus state fora).  
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decision addressed a procedural rather than substantive interpreta-
tion of the statute.107  
 State and local civil rights laws authorizing analogous causes of 
action for gender-based bias crimes also appear to be used rarely. 
Many states had, and continue to have, laws on the books providing 
civil as well as criminal remedies for bias-motivated violence.108 Cur-
rently, eleven states and the District of Columbia include “sex” or 
“gender” as one of the categories that can give rise to civil recovery 
under those bias crime laws.109 Although these laws offer only a 
patchwork of protection nationwide, as a substantive matter, they 
authorize relief that is similar to (and often broader than) that pro-
vided by the VAWA civil rights remedy and the analogous state civil 
rights laws modeled after it.110 Yet, not unlike the sole decision in-
terpreting a post-Morrison civil rights statute, the reported decisions 
in cases involving these laws all adjudicate procedural issues; none of 
the reported decisions analyze the merits of the claim of gender-
motivated harm.111  
 The relative infrequency with which these laws are invoked raises 
difficult questions about the efficacy of the approach. The apparent 
under-use could signal a variety of issues. It could reflect a lack of 
public awareness and knowledge about the law, which could be re-
dressed through education campaigns. To some extent, this is likely 
the case. The federal law, which was more widely publicized than 
state analogues, was used more frequently than the state enact-
ments. But the federal law was not as widely invoked as some had 
anticipated. Of course, this could reflect the constitutional contro-
versy that surrounded the law since the first claims were com-
 
 107. In Cadiz-Jones v. Zambetti, a domestic violence survivor brought a claim against 
her former fiance under New York City’s then-recently enacted law after her VAWA civil 
rights claim was dismissed in response to the Morrison decision. N.Y.L.J., Apr. 29, 2002, at 
21. The court rejected the defendant’s arguments that the local law would not apply retro-
actively, but it did not address the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Id.; see also Goldscheid, 
supra note 49, at 166.  
 108. Many of these laws are part of their states’ bias crime statutes. See ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, STATE HATE CRIME STATUTORY PROVISIONS, available at 
http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/state_hate_crime_laws.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) 
(listing statutory provisions); LU-IN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW (1994) (listing and discuss-
ing statutory provisions).   
 109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.4 (West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3704 (LexisNexis 2004); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1(a), -(c) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 729A.2, 729A.5 
(West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.12, §§ 11H, I (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.147b (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.79 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-113 
(2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-1(b) (West 2004); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1455(a), 1457 (West 2004); 
WASH. REV CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083 (West 2004). 
 110. These statutes generally are drafted with a broader statutory formulation and au-
thorize comparable types of relief within similar limitations periods. See Goldscheid, supra 
note 49, at 165-71 (detailing the structure of these statutes).  
 111. See id. (detailing decisions). 
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menced. However, practical concerns associated with abuse and the 
limitation of litigation-based approaches to transform public percep-
tions may outweigh, or at least mitigate, the conceptual appeal of 
holding individuals accountable for their behavior as a civil rights 
violation.112 These issues combine to limit victims’ use of these reme-
dies and, therefore, render the approach less likely to deliver its 
promise of expanded redress. 
B.   The Transformational Power of Civil Rights Remedies 
 Commentators widely, and often reflexively, assert that civil 
rights remedies hold greater potential than other approaches to 
transform the discriminatory attitudes that underlie acts such as 
domestic and sexual violence. For example, in debates preceding the 
enactment of the civil rights remedy of the 1994 Violence Against 
Women Act, proponents summarily lauded those remedies’ superior 
value.113 This reflexive embrace of a civil rights claim for damages is 
not unique to violence against women. Commentators in other con-
texts also presume that civil rights claims hold symbolic and political 
advantage over traditional remedies such as those based in contract 
or tort.114 But the nature of this transformative power and civil rights 
laws’ ability to realize this potential is not always clear. This Section 
begins to unpack this transformative claim.115  I posit that there are 
at least three axis on which civil rights claims’ transformative power 
can be assessed: (1) prompting policy and behavioral changes; (2) 
changing discriminatory attitudes; and (3) advancing broader social 
movements. This Section analyzes each in turn. 
 
 112. This argument is elaborated more fully in Part IV.A.1, infra. 
 113. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 55 (describing legislative history); Nourse, 
supra note 35, at 5-36 (same). 
 114. See, e.g., Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1434 
(2005) (“Civil rights law, [in contrast to tort law], confers legitimacy. Causes are noble, vic-
tims deserving, and violators vile.”); Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a 
Magic Bullet? Environmental Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and 
Imperatives, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 38-39 (1996) (discussing symbolic value of civil rights 
violation in environmental racism claims).  
 115. While considering a related question, Donna Coker draws on Ruth Morris’ work 
and advances the concept of “transformative justice” for domestic violence victims. See 
Donna Coker, Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination Processes in Cases of Domestic 
Violence, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 128, 143-50 (Heather Strang & 
John Braithwaite eds., 2002). She uses the term to discuss justice system processes that 
address the sources of battered women’s inequality and the subordinating systems that 
may operate in the batterer’s life. Id. at 144. My reference to the “transformative” power of 
civil rights remedies similarly looks to the social and cultural context in which domestic 
and sexual violence persist. However, I use the term to discuss the impact of a particular 
form of legal intervention whereas she addresses the impact on the justice system on sur-
vivors more generally.  
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1.   Prompting Policy and Behavioral Changes 
 One way in which the transformation of societal attitudes can be 
manifested is through changes in public policy. Although public poli-
cies are expressed and reflected in many ways, one tangible and im-
portant expression of public policy can be found in workplace policies. 
Antidiscrimination laws have dramatically reshaped hiring and pro-
motional practices.116 Public awareness generated by the cases liti-
gated in the 1970s and 1980s culminating in the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that sexual harassment (including sexual assault) was a 
form of discrimination led some companies to implement anti-sexual 
harassment policies.117 Although some responded on their own to the 
changing law and social climate, others were mandated to devise and 
implement policies and to train their employees accordingly as part 
of court-ordered injunctive relief in successful claims.118 The 1991 
Civil Rights Act’s119 increase in potential recoverable damages, in-
cluding punitive damages, heightened employers’ motivations to en-
act policies that might reduce the prevalence of claims.120 At least 
one study indicates that by 1998, ninety-seven percent of companies 
responding to a survey conducted by the Society for Human Resource 
Management already had policies defining and prohibiting sexual 
harassment as unlawful and a violation of workplace rules.121
 The 1998 Supreme Court decisions of Faraghar v. City of Boca 
Raton122 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth123 enhanced the 
role of employer anti-sexual harassment policies by insulating em-
ployers from liability for harassment by supervisors if the employer 
could demonstrate that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly” sexually harassing behavior and that the employee 
“unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or correc-
tive opportunities provided by the employer.”124 These cases widely 
 
 116. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 334 (2005); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Em-
ployment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 467 (2001). 
 117. See Melissa Hart, Litigation Narratives: Why Jensen v. Ellerth Didn’t Change 
Sexual Harassment Law, but Still Has a Story Worth Telling, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 
282, 291-92 (2003) .  
 118. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (determining that 
defendant employer should be ordered to establish, disseminate, and implement policy and 
sexual harassment complaint procedure). 
 119. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)). 
 120. Ann M. Anderson, Note, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of Vicari-
ous Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799, 826-27 (2000). 
 121. Hart, supra note 117, at 292 (citing SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT, SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 7 (1999)). 
 122. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 123. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 124. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Although an anti-sexual har-
assment policy alone would not automatically insulate an employer from liability, the exis-
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are credited as providing employers an incentive to implement sexual 
harassment policies.125 Some analyses suggest that an employer’s 
implementation of an antiharassment policy can have tremendous 
impact on that company’s potential liability, perhaps even determin-
ing the outcome of a case.126 Whether due to the recent decisions, to 
shifts in public opinion, or to the type of coaching employers receive 
from law firms and consultants concerned with avoiding liability, 
anti-sexual harassment policies now are widespread and common-
place components of employment policies.  
 Despite these advances, it would be incorrect to presume that 
working conditions have dramatically changed or that sex discrimi-
nation or harassment has been eliminated just because an employer 
has implemented an antiharassment policy. To the contrary, work-
place discrimination persists in perhaps more insidious forms not-
withstanding the development of legal rules and workplace policies 
proscribing overt discrimination.127 In the context of sexual harass-
ment, some argue that fear of liability based on a lack of understand-
ing of the law has led to overbroad policies that punish sexual con-
duct without addressing the underlying gender inequality sexual 
harassment law is intended to redress.128 These critiques suggest 
that antiharassment policies may be unsuccessful either in curbing a 
wide range of harassing behavior or in changing the discriminatory 
attitudes that allow the harassment to flourish.129 Antiharassment 
policies may also have limited effects due to constraints associated 
with their implementation. Some have demonstrated that supervi-
 
tence of such a policy, with a suitable complaint procedure, would be relevant to the ques-
tion of liability. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 116, at 337; Sturm, supra note 116, at 482; Deborah 
Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law in the United States and South Africa: Facilitating the 
Transition from Legal Standards to Social Norms, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 143, 174 (2002). 
 126. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 117, at 291-92 (reviewing surveys demonstrating that 
plaintiffs prevailed in 71% of cases in which the employer had no formal sexual harass-
ment program or generalized grievance process, while plaintiffs only prevailed in approxi-
mately one-third of cases in which employers had some anti-sexual harassment policy in 
place). 
 127. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form 
over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3, 5-6 (2003); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Dis-
crimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995); 
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 
(1993); Sturm, supra note 116, at 458; cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318-28 
(1987) (addressing persistence of workplace discrimination notwithstanding prohibition 
of intentional discrimination).  
 128. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2067 (2003); Zalesne, 
supra note 131, at 178; see also, e.g., Susan Bison-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor 
Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education 
and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) 
(discussing impact of training programs implemented to reduce risks of liability). 
 129. See Schultz, supra note 128, at 2131. 
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sors use antiharassment policies in a way that discourages com-
plaints and elicits complaints about only the most egregious forms of 
harassment rather than prompting cultural changes within an or-
ganization.130 In addition, increased public and media focus on sexual 
harassment has produced a backlash in which many believe that the 
law has tipped too far in favor of employees.131  
 Nevertheless, the expansion of antiharassment policies has suc-
ceeded in naming the problem, bringing public attention to it (even if 
in the form of debate criticizing the evolution in the doctrine) and of-
fering some modicum of protection and an avenue of redress to em-
ployees who are subjected to unwanted harassment. Notwithstand-
ing the limitations of workplace antiharassment policies, they can 
shape workplace behavior through their disciplining function, even if 
they operate only to modify conduct at the margins (that is, extreme 
rather than subtle forms of harassment). Workplace policies may be 
ineffective in changing behaviors or attitudes outside the workplace, 
but they may have some impact in changing the range of acceptable 
behaviors at work even if they fall short of prompting all the changes 
in the workplace that are needed. 
 The history of litigation against police departments for failing to 
respond appropriately to domestic violence claims similarly reflects 
both the power and the limitations of civil rights lawsuits to produce 
meaningful change. As discussed earlier, these claims played a sub-
stantial role in spurring police and local law enforcement to develop 
and implement policies requiring police to take domestic violence 
claims seriously.132 Yet despite changes in formal policies, victims 
and advocates still struggle to obtain consistently effective law en-
forcement responses. 
 Claims against individuals lack the same capacity to produce pol-
icy change. Although there is some sense in which civil rights law is 
connected to social norms that influence and perhaps shape indi-
viduals’ behavior, it is unlikely that a civil rights remedy would have 
greater power to change individuals’ behavior than would other 
sources of civil liability such as tort law or provisions authorizing or-
ders of protection.133 The home offers no easy analogy to a workplace 
 
 130. See Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the 
Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 83, 114-20 (2005). 
 131. Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law: Has It Gone Too Far, or Has the Me-
dia?, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 351, 352-53 (1999). 
 132. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. 
 133. The argument that a civil rights claim holds greater transformative power than 
other legal claims because it holds greater normative value is difficult to test. While there 
is some merit to the possibility that a defendant may view his conduct differently once it is 
challenged through litigation, it is difficult to imagine that the precise nature of the claim, 
e.g., civil rights versus tort, would substantially impact his reactions. I have uncovered no 
empirical studies that address the question.  
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policy that articulates the governing norms of conduct. Other legal 
provisions such as those that authorize orders of protection may hold 
as much potential, at least as a theoretical matter, for establishing 
norms of behavior that govern conduct in the home. It is difficult to 
imagine how civil rights redress would add to the norm-shaping be-
havior available through that type of remedy, which can be tailored 
specifically to an individual’s predictions of how violence is ex-
pressed.134 In that sense, civil rights claims against institutions, with 
their attendant ability to shape explicit norm-stating policies in 
the institutional setting, may be more effective tools for prompting 
policy or behavioral change than claims brought against individu-
als. This bolsters the importance of reforming laws governing in-
stitutional liability.135
2.   Changing Discriminatory Attitudes 
 Another way civil rights laws hold a promise of transformational 
change is by challenging the underlying biases that allow discrimina-
tion to persist. This issue has been examined in the workplace con-
text. One of Title VII’s goals is to reach the “entire spectrum” of dis-
crimination, including both intentional and unintentional conduct, 
that perpetuates exclusionary policies and practices.136 Yet laws such 
as Title VII have proved to be inadequate to reach the more uncon-
scious biases that define the “second generation” antidiscrimination 
claims that more commonly arise today.137  
 Recent scholarship has advanced several alternative approaches 
through which the law might more effectively challenge underlying 
discriminatory biases. Charles Lawrence critiques the intentional 
discrimination framework governing equal protection claims and ad-
vocates inquiry into the cultural meaning of the allegedly discrimina-
 
 134. See FREDRICA L. LEHRMAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4-
6 to 4-7 (2005) (discussing civil protection orders); Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Or-
loff, Civil Protection Orders, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL 
PRACTICE: A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK § 4-1 (2d ed. 2004); see also Nat’l Council of Juve-
nile and Family Court Judges, Domestic Violence Statute Search, 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/255/300 (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (search en-
gine for state-specific domestic violence statutes). 
 135. The nature of specific proposals for reform is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 136. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (citing Sprogis v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)); accord Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under [Title VII], practices . . . neutral on their face, and 
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”). 
 137. Krieger, supra note 127, at 1164 (recognizing inadequacy of Title VII in address-
ing “subtle, often unconscious forms of bias” Congress intended Title VII to remedy); 
Sturm, supra note 116, at 460 (defining “second generation” employment discrimination 
claims and recognizing that “[c]ognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of 
interaction have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued 
inequality”). 
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tory actions.138 In the context of statutory discrimination claims, 
Susan Sturm recommends adopting a structural approach that en-
courages the development of institutions and processes that advance 
antidiscrimination norms through internal problem-solving sys-
tems.139 David Oppenheimer endorses adoption of a “negligent dis-
crimination” standard to root out unconscious discrimination.140  
 Others draw on insights from cognitive psychology.141 For exam-
ple, Linda Krieger’s analysis of cognition theory demonstrates that 
discriminatory acts may not reflect biased motive or intent as much 
as they reflect perceptive, interpretive, and memorial processes that 
may be both unconscious and unintentional.142 Under that view, cog-
nitive biases are unwelcome byproducts of otherwise adaptive cogni-
tive processes.143 Krieger would direct Title VII’s attention away from 
inquiries about intentionality to an inquiry into causation.144 She ar-
gues that antidiscrimination laws would be more effective in reduc-
ing intergroup bias if they were understood as a fulfilling “prescrip-
tive duty to identify and control” for inevitable cognition errors that 
underlie discriminatory acts.145 However, she calls for more research 
about how biases can be reduced or controlled before elaborating a 
more detailed proscriptive approach.146  
 Other similar theories posit that unconscious bias may be reduced 
by promoting counterstereotypes or eliminating negative stereotypes 
in physical or sensory surroundings, or by increasing opportunities 
for intergroup contact.147 Current antidiscrimination law models 
could address underlying bias, for example, through doctrines that 
promote a diverse supervisory workforce148 or that require elimi-
 
 138. See Lawrence, supra note 127, at 344-45. 
 139. Sturm, supra note 116, at 491-92.  
 140. Oppenheimer, supra note 127, at 899. 
 141. For a summary of recent scholarship, see, e.g., Linda H. Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, 
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate 
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1003 n. 21 (2006). 
 142. See id. at 1211. 
 143. Accordingly, the law can support interventions that aim to unearth the biases and 
prevent them from influencing behavior. Id. at 1216-17. 
 144. Id. at 1242. 
 145. Id. at 1245 (emphasis omitted). 
 146. Id. at 1245-47. 
 147. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and 
the Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 1, 23-25, 28-29 (2000) (reviewing social science data on whether con-
tact with another group (e.g., of people of other races) decreases bias); Anthony G. 
Greenwald & Linda H. Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 
963-65 (2006) (recounting studies showing that implicit biases may be modified by expo-
sure to counter-stereotypic imagery).  
 148. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 
978 (2006). 
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nation of negative stereotypes and promote counterstereotypes in 
the workplace.149   
 These analyses of workplace antidiscrimination laws have inter-
esting implications for the use of civil rights laws to address the gen-
der bias that underlies domestic and sexual violence. First, consider 
the argument that current antidiscrimination doctrine can reduce in-
correct biases by eliminating stereotypical imagery in the workplace. 
To some extent, the debiasing that would occur should also reduce 
domestic and sexual violence because (1) some domestic and sexual 
violence takes place at work and (2) to the extent that perpetrators of 
domestic and sexual violence are employed at workplaces in which 
stereotypical imagery was eliminated and replaced by “positive” im-
agery, any resulting reductions in biased behavior might have the ef-
fect of reducing biased behavior (such as domestic and sexual vio-
lence) outside the workplace. Of course, that projection would have to 
be tested through further examination and empirical study.  
 The applicability of the argument that workplace diversity rules 
could reduce the degree of racial or other group-based bias to domes-
tic and sexual violence is more complex. The social science studies 
underlying that argument are premised on findings that the presence 
of role models or authority figures in historically marginalized 
groups (for example, African Americans) reduces manifestations of 
unconscious racial bias by white study participants.150 The study re-
sults may reflect at least in part the extent to which we continue to 
live in a race-segregated society in which there is limited contact be-
tween the races. By contrast, sex discrimination persists despite the 
fact that we live in a highly sex-integrated society. If the debiasing 
that occurs is premised on increasing otherwise limited or nonexist-
ing contact between the races, debiasing through diversity enhance-
ment may not translate to efforts to reduce domestic and sexual vio-
lence, since men and women typically have a good deal of contact 
with one another. 
 On the other hand, if what underlies the debiasing that occurs 
through intergroup contact is the reversal of traditional power dy-
namics and the introduction of counter-stereotypical imagery (for ex-
ample, the situating of African Americans in positions of relative 
power, authority, and status), the studies could be useful in crafting 
law and policy reform that addresses the gender biases that underlie 
domestic and sexual violence. To the extent that such violence is in-
formed and supported by media and cultural imagery condoning sub-
jugation of (primarily) women through violence, it may be that broad-
based shifts in media and cultural imagery can impact domestic and 
 
 149. Id. at 982-83. 
 150. Id. at 981 (referencing studies). 
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sexual violence as well. 151 At the very least, these studies offer fruit-
ful suggestions for potential ways to address the underlying biases 
that are the target of civil rights-based approaches to domestic and 
sexual violence. 
 Another way that workplaces address discriminatory attitudes is 
through training and education programs. These programs may be 
undertaken voluntarily or can be a required part of a court order fol-
lowing a discrimination suit.152 Although these programs cannot 
mandate changed attitudes, they can foster or promote changed 
norms and accompanying behavioral changes and may affect atti-
tudes as well.153 Programs involving face-to-face exchanges between 
members of diverse groups and small group discussions of controver-
sial issues have been found to be successful in helping employers and 
employees understand the injury that antidiscrimination law is in-
tended to prevent and in creating an awareness of and sensitivity to 
divergent viewpoints.154 This suggests that initiatives in which pro-
gram participants explicitly discuss the role of discriminatory atti-
tudes in perpetuating domestic and sexual violence could be useful in 
curbing abuse. Further research would be helpful in assessing 
whether that approach would be effective.155  
3.   Advancing Social Movements/Equality as Rhetoric 
 Recent scholarship on the interaction of law and social change has 
been widely critical of the ability of law, and specifically of the notion 
of rights, to produce meaningful social change.156 Theoretical and 
 
 151. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 127, at 1246 (calling for “broad-based” cultural 
change in order effectively to address workplace discrimination). 
 152. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace 
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1217 (1989); Bison-Rapp, supra note 128, at 15-25 (describ-
ing use of training programs); see also notes 116-31 and accompanying text (describing 
workplace anti-sexual harassment policies). 
 153. See Abrams, supra note 152, at 1219 (advocating holding supervisors and manag-
ers responsible for setting and enforcing antidiscrimination standards); but see Bison-
Rapp, supra note 128, at 29, 31-38 (cautioning that training programs also may reinforce 
stereotypes and produce attitude polarization). 
 154. Abrams, supra note 152. 
 155. Some batterer’s intervention programs incorporate an explicitly “feminist” cur-
riculum in which participants discuss the ways in which domestic violence is rooted in tra-
ditionally discriminatory attitudes about gender. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, OJP, NIJ, 
Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal Justice Strategies (1998), avail-
able at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/168638.txt (describing varying approaches to batterer 
intervention programs). The few studies evaluating the success of these programs, how-
ever, indicates that they may have a limited impact in producing attitudinal change. See 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Batterer Intervention Programs: Where Do We Go from Here? (June 
2003), available at www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/195079.pdf; Daniel J. Saunders & Richard 
M. Hamill, NIJ, Violence Against Women: Synthesis of Research on Offender Interventions 
(2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201222.pdf. 
 156. For a summary of critical legal studies’ critiques of antidiscrimination law and an 
argument refocusing the law to account for entrenched discrimination, see, e.g., Kimberlé 
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empirical scholarship in this area has challenged the “myth of rights” 
and argues that litigation is a necessarily limited tool in producing 
social change.157 As Kathy Abrams has observed about the power of 
litigation to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, “[l]itigation . . . 
can be too crude a tool for achieving the often subtle changes in un-
derstanding that produce equal treatment or regard for women.”158
 Instead, some have urged a view of “rights”-based reform in which 
assertions of rights are seen as instrumental in political mobilization 
rather than as ends in and of themselves.159 As Liz Schneider has ar-
gued, rights-based advocacy can be a catalyst for organizing and 
catalyzing political action.160 Kimberlé Crenshaw similarly has ob-
served that law reform has served an important cultural role by 
eliminating symbolic manifestations of racial oppression, even 
though it has not achieved material equality.161 Litigation accord-
ingly is most powerful when it complements social activism move-
ments addressing the same issues.162  
 
W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-
discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). For additional sources enumerating 
the limitations of law in producing social change, see Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights 
Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20-39 (1985) (discussing limitations and utility of litigation 
in ending race discrimination); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 
1384 (1984) (arguing that a rights-based approach leads people to focus on legal rights dis-
course instead of the real objectives antidiscrimination laws seek to effect); see also JOEL F. 
HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 39-40, 212-22 (1978); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY 
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 4-12, 48-91 (1994); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 107-56, 202-
27 (1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 151-98 (2d ed. Univ. of Mich. 
Press 2004).  
 157. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 156, at 13-79; accord Bell, supra note 156; Zalesne, supra 
note 125, at 184 (discussing normative arguments). For other arguments that “rights-
based” construction of antidiscrimination norms entrench, rather than reduce, discrimina-
tion, see KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
VICTIMS 19-22 (1988).   
 158. Abrams, supra note 152, at 1196. 
 159. See HANDLER, supra note 156, at 39-40, 212-22; MCCANN, supra note 156, at 4-12, 
48-91; ROSENBERG, supra note 156, at 107-56; SCHEINGOLD, supra note 156, at 83-96; Nad-
ine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328, 328-55 (David Kairys ed., 1998).  
 160. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the 
Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 650 (1986). 
 161. Crenshaw, supra note 156, at 1331; accord PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY 
OF RACE AND RIGHTS 159-65 (1991) (arguing that the notion of “rights” represents impor-
tant markers of citizenship and should be expanded rather than discarded). 
 162. Several scholars have examined this theory at length. For example, Michael 
McCann’s study of the pay equity movement demonstrated how legal tactics positively af-
fected the movement by, for example, enhancing visibility, engendering participation, com-
pelling formal policy concessions, and increasing confidence and sophistication among 
those advancing claims. MCCANN, supra note 156, at 278-88. Gerald Rosenberg’s study of 
the civil rights, abortion and women’s rights, environment, reapportionment, and criminal 
law reform movements similarly concludes that litigation plays an important role in social 
movements but that the nature of the role will change depending on, among other things, 
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 Civil rights claims to redress domestic and sexual violence readily 
can be seen in this context. For example, even though the VAWA 
civil rights remedy was struck down as unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court, it played a critical role as part of a broader social 
movement to enhance legal protections and social services for domes-
tic and sexual violence victims. Specifically, the civil rights remedy 
was instrumental in the enactment of the 1994 Violence Against 
Women Act. That law was the first comprehensive federal legislation 
to address domestic and sexual violence. It subsequently has been 
reauthorized and expanded to more effectively address victims’ needs 
and gaps in legal protections and services.163 The legislation ad-
dressed a wide range of issues—including support for social service 
programs, initiatives that would improve law enforcement responses 
to the problem, requirements for interstate recognition of domestic 
violence protective orders, and provisions enabling battered immi-
grant women to obtain legal status without having to rely on abusive 
partners.164 These provisions have been critical in transforming the 
scope and breadth of resources and services available to victims. No-
tably, in debates preceding VAWA’s enactment, controversy centered 
around the civil rights remedy rather than around any of those other 
provisions.165 In some sense, the civil rights remedy is a classic ex-
ample of the instrumental use of a civil rights law to advance other 
substantive political gains. 
 In addition to this instrumental role, it may well be that the pub-
lic debate occasioned by the litigation surrounding the civil rights 
remedy also helped advance its transformative goals. In this sense, 
the law can be seen as serving an expressive function, in which it 
helped shape social norms even if it didn’t itself produce tangible 
benefits.166 Even though the VAWA civil rights remedy ultimately 
was struck down, it attracted much public attention, during both the 
debates over its enactment and the subsequent litigation concerning 
its constitutionality. The occurrence of these debates themselves 
raised public awareness of the issue and may well have affected indi-
 
the extent of political support and the extent to which legal efforts are visible and gener-
ally endorsed by the public. ROSENBERG, supra note 156, at 343. 
 163. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491. 
 164. For a summary of the provisions in the 1994 enactment, see Goldscheid, supra 
note 43, at 110-16; see also Family Violence Prevention Fund, History of the Violence 
Against Women Act, http://www.endabuse.org/vawa/display.php?DocID=34005 (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2007) (summarizing provisions). 
 165. See Russell, supra note 99, at 331. 
 166. For a discussion of the symbolic and norm-shaping value of criminal hate crime 
laws, see, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive 
Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1247-72 (2000) (reviewing 
scholarship). 
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viduals’ views of the problem. As someone who litigated a number of 
these cases, including the Morrison case that progressed to the Su-
preme Court, I was struck by the reactions of laypeople, who often 
expressed disbelief that Congress might not have the power to enact 
a civil rights law providing redress for gender-based violence. The 
constitutional scope of the litigation undoubtedly raised the profile of 
and media attention paid to the issue in a way that tort claims ordi-
narily do not. On the other hand, the public nature of the debate over 
the federal civil rights remedy also produced backlash against the 
law in the form of commentary by those convinced the matter should 
be only of local concern and those opposed to new civil rights protec-
tions.167 Although the net result is difficult if not impossible to 
measure, the high profile of the civil rights litigation at a minimum 
increased public debate about and importantly drew attention to 
the problem.  
 International human rights law provides another example of the 
instrumental power of claims that domestic and sexual violence are a 
form of sex discrimination. Some international human rights instru-
ments directly equate domestic and sexual violence as a form of sex 
discrimination.168 The rhetorical linking of the two issues has formed 
a powerful foundation for advocacy in support of a wide range of legal 
 
 167. See Russell, supra note 99, at 334-88 (tracing media coverage and opinion about 
the law’s constitutionality). 
 168. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N.G.A. Res. 48/104, 
intro., Art. 4 U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/ 
huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.48.104.En?Opendocument (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (in-
cluding efforts to eliminate violence against women as part of directives to eliminate sex 
discrimination); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (“CEDAW”) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#intro; Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Gen. Rec. No. 19: Violence 
Against Women (11th session, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ 
recommendations/recomm.htm#top (defining “gender-based violence” as a form of dis-
crimination); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication 
of Violence Against Women (“Convention of Belem do Para”), opened for signature June 9, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, available at http://www.oas.org/CIM/english/Laws.Rat.Belem.HTM 
(determining states’ sex equality obligations require initiatives to address domestic and 
sexual violence); Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, art. 8, opened for signature July 11-Aug. 13, 2003, available 
at http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Convention_%Protocols/ 
Protocol%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf (same); see also United Nations, Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, General Com-
ment No. 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, art. 3 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 
(2000) (providing protection from gender-based violence during armed conflict); 11 (calling 
for information on state laws prohibiting domestic violence, including rape, and female 
genital mutilation); 12 (calling for information from states on efforts to prohibit traffick-
ing); 14 (calling for information on laws or practices condoning confinement of women); 16 
(calling for information on laws that restrict of women’s movement); 24 (supporting mar-
riage as a free choice by, inter alia, proscribing attitudes that marginalize women victims 
of rape); 31 (declaring that “honour crimes” violate Convention). 
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and policy initiatives, even though many of those initiatives do not 
directly address sex discrimination.169  
 This interaction between law reform and related social move-
ments may also explain the success of reform efforts to address do-
mestic violence in the most recent generation of reforms beginning in 
the 1970s. Those efforts were born out of a social movement in which 
domestic violence victims played a central role by helping to define 
its goals, strategies, and objectives.170 One of the limitations of the 
more recent use of civil rights remedies to redress domestic and sex-
ual violence may lie in a disconnect between those promoting civil 
rights remedies and the grassroots movements advocating legal and 
policy reform on behalf of domestic and sexual violence victims. Al-
though the civil rights remedy was effective as part of a legislative 
agenda to broaden federal protections and funding sources, it was 
less directly connected to victims’ concerns and demands. In contrast 
to the reforms that began in the 1970s, the civil rights remedy does 
not directly respond to a need that victims frequently voice. Domestic 
and sexual violence victims more likely articulate needs for concrete 
resources—such as funding, assistance with custody or other family 
law matters, immigration issues, employment, or housing—than a 
need for a civil remedy. Of course, this may reflect a lack of aware-
ness of civil legal remedies and their potential or, perhaps, a failure 
to organize a political movement that would make the remedy’s value 
more readily apparent. Indeed, the current system of service provi-
sion has been criticized as increasingly neutralized and devoid of po-
litical or social content.171 But it may also be true that one of the civil 
rights remedy’s limitations is that it is not reflective of victims’ per-
ceptions of the problem or their legal needs. To that end, future re-
form efforts should be grounded in victims’ experiences, views of the 
problems, and desired solutions and linked to organizing efforts to 
advance those goals.172  
 
 169. See Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 386-91 (recounting range of policy advances 
spurred by international legal instrument’s prohibition of domestic and sexual violence as 
a form of sex discrimination).  
 170. See supra Part II.  
 171. See Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 373-78; accord Martha McMahon & Ellen Pence, 
Making Social Change: Reflections on Individual and Institutional Advocacy with Women 
Arrested for Domestic Violence, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 47, 70 (2003) (noting that “in-
creasing numbers of advocacy programs are using gender-neutral language to describe 
their services”). 
 172. See infra Part IV. 
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IV.   RECONCEPTUALIZING EQUALITY 
A.   Expanding Compensatory Relief 
 One of the primary goals of civil rights remedies was to expand 
the avenues for recovery for the practical—that is, financial—losses 
that result from abuse. This section analyzes the ways that civil 
rights claims fashioned as causes of action against individual perpe-
trators are inherently limited. It also suggests alternative ap-
proaches to expanding victims’ ability to recover. 
1.   Limits of Civil Rights Recovery from Individuals 
 Civil rights claims against individual perpetrators generally are 
less frequently made than claims against institutions. Some of the 
reasons are familiar. From a practical perspective, civil rights claims 
against individuals may be less advantageous because individuals 
generally can support less generous financial awards than can insti-
tutions. This argument applies to all civil claims against individuals, 
regardless of the underlying factual basis (for example, domestic vio-
lence as opposed to other forms of bias crimes) and regardless of the 
claim’s underlying theory (for example, civil rights as opposed to torts).  
 Civil claims against individuals who have committed domestic or 
sexual violence present unique challenges regardless of whether the 
claim is brought under tort, civil rights, or some other theory. Schol-
ars including Sarah Buel, Clare Dalton, and Jennifer Wriggins have 
noted the dearth of tort claims arising from domestic violence.173 
Sarah Buel posits that the lack of tort claims stems in part from fac-
tors such as the lack of awareness of the ability to bring tort claims, 
attorneys’ failure to identify or clients’ failure to disclose domestic 
violence issues, misconceptions that batterers lack sufficient assets 
to make a tort claim “worthwhile,” attorney distaste for handling 
domestic violence claims, and racial and cultural factors that deter 
engagement with the legal system.174 Many women would not choose 
to engage with a justice system they distrust, whether due to previ-
ous experiences with bias or to fear of retaliation due to a victim’s 
immigration status.175 Civil remedies contain an inherent class bias, 
 
 173. See, e.g., Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Ob-
stacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 949-55 
(2004); Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Pos-
sibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 350-53, 366-68 (1997); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic 
Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 133-51 (2001). 
 174. Buel, supra note 173, at 950-54 (arguing also that doctrinal limitations unneces-
sarily preclude claims).  
 175. For women of color in particular, experience with law enforcement’s racial bias 
may at least in part explain their reluctance to engage with the civil or criminal justice 
systems. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 
TUL. L. REV. 167, 193 n.137 (2004) (citing sources). Although immigration laws increas-
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since they are useful only to the extent perpetrators have sufficient 
assets to justify litigation. Of course, this does not negate the power 
of civil remedies to recover or at least assign whatever assets the 
perpetrator does have to the survivor.  
 These considerations could also explain the scarcity of civil rights 
claims brought against individuals under both the VAWA civil rights 
remedy, while it was in effect, and under the analogous state and lo-
cal laws still in effect.176 With respect to the VAWA civil rights rem-
edy, commentators posited various explanations for the relatively few 
cases brought while the law was in effect. Some argued that any un-
derutilization may have been based on potential litigants’ lack of 
awareness of what the law would offer or on the fact that the law was 
embroiled in constitutional controversy since its enactment.177 Others 
pointed to the narrow crafting of its statutory terms.178  
 There is no doubt that lack of awareness of legal claims, by both 
victims and practitioners, limits the extent to which new laws will be 
invoked. However, the apparently limited use of the more broadly 
crafted state civil bias crime laws suggests that the utility of a civil 
remedy in this context is limited by structural factors. For example, a 
domestic violence victim rationally may choose not to reengage with 
the batterer through tort or other civil litigation out of a desire to 
limit, rather than increase, her contact with him. She may reasona-
bly fear that the batterer would use the civil litigation context as a 
further device for perpetuating a pattern of coercion and control over 
her.179 The difficulties of collection may deter many from commencing 
civil claims even when defendants have assets. The prospect of addi-
tional litigation with an abuser over collection may render civil suits 
sufficiently unappealing to deter the use of civil remedies. On a more 
symbolic level, the nature of the claim, framed as a problem between 
two individuals, reinscribes it as private in nature.  
 The laws may be underutilized as well due to the difficulty victims 
of domestic and sexual violence continue to face in obtaining counsel 
notwithstanding fee-shifting provisions in most of the civil rights 
 
ingly allow domestic and sexual violence victims who rely on their abusers for immigration 
status to independently apply for legal status, victims nevertheless fear reprisals, particu-
larly if they are unaware of the reforms that could offer relief. Id. 
 176. See generally Goldscheid, supra note 49, at 165-71 (reviewing cases). Of course, it 
is possible that these claims are raised in cases, including matrimonial and support ac-
tions, that do not result in reported decisions. However, with few exceptions, there is no indica-
tion from the literature or from practitioner reports that these claims are routinely invoked. 
 177. SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 193. 
 178. See Goldfarb, supra note 38, at 260-69. 
 179. For example, she may fear that he will retaliate against her or that he might 
jeopardize her custody of her children; see also Goldscheid, supra note 175, at 222-23; Julie 
Goldscheid, Advancing Equality in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 417, 422-23 (2003). 
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laws.180 Victims in civil claims continue to have their private lives 
and personal histories subjected to scrutiny notwithstanding rape 
shield laws.181 In addition, these laws may not offer the remedies 
most victims of domestic and sexual violence seek, such as financial 
assistance (from sources other than the batterer), jobs, childcare, 
immigration assistance, and legal representation.182 To the extent 
that that is the case, remedies that address those unmet legal needs 
would be most useful.183  
2.   Alternative Approaches to Restoring Economic Imbalances 
 Given the limitations of civil rights remedies, other approaches to 
compensating victims for the economic harms associated with domes-
tic and sexual violence should be considered. The economic impact of 
domestic and sexual violence is increasingly well-documented. A re-
cent study concluded that intimate partner rape, physical assault, 
and stalking cost the United States over $5.8 billion each year for 
expenses such as medical and mental health care services, lost pro-
ductivity from paid work and household chores, and losses in lifetime 
savings.184 Another study that measured the costs of interpersonal 
violence (a somewhat larger category than intimate partner violence) 
concluded that interpersonal violence cost the United States economy 
$12.6 billion annually.185 Domestic and sexual assault survivors fre-
 
 180. See INST. FOR LAW & JUSTICE & NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, NATIONAL 
EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS PROGRAM 11-17 (2005), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208612.pdf (detailing continuing unmet needs for 
legal services notwithstanding federal funding civil legal assistance programs). To the ex-
tent that civil legal services attorneys assist victims, their scarce resources generally are 
devoted to issues such as custody, child protection and visitation issues. See also, e.g., 
Goldscheid, supra note 175, at 222 nn.278-79 (describing challenges domestic and sexual 
violence victims face in obtaining legal counsel); Wriggins, supra note 173, at 135-37 (ex-
plaining how lack of insurance coverage for domestic violence reduces availability of legal 
counsel for domestic violence victims seeking to bring tort claims).  
 181. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: 
Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH L. REV. 51, 94-141 (2002) (de-
tailing cases in which rape shield laws failed to exclude evidence of women’s sexual history 
from trial); see also, e.g., NBCSports.com News Servs., Rape Case Against Bryant Dis-
missed, Sept. 2, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5861379 (reporting trial judge’s deci-
sion to admit evidence about accuser’s sex life in the days surrounding alleged sexual as-
sault by Kobe Bryant).  
 182. Goldscheid, supra note 179, at 418. 
 183. For example, the 2005 VAWA Reauthorization authorized significant funding for 
civil legal assistance in a range of legal claims. See Violence Against Women and Depart-
ment of Justice Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, 2978-79, §§ 103-04 (2006). 
 184. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2, 27-33 (2003). 
 185. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
20-22 (2004), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241591609.pdf (es-
timated costs of intimate partner violence range from $3.5 to $12.6 billion per year and es-
timated costs of rape range from $159 million to $6.5 billion per year). 
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quently face difficulty keeping their jobs due to their experiences of 
abuse, either because their abuser harassed them on the job or be-
cause the circumstances associated with the abuse prevented them 
from keeping their jobs.186
 Increased publicity about the civil rights remedies that remain on 
the books may increase claims that compensate victims for their 
losses. Law reform directed at institutional accountability also may 
redress the economic inequalities resulting from abuse. In addition, 
alternative frameworks for compensation should be explored. For ex-
ample, crime victim compensation funds are available in every state 
and can provide recovery for the out-of-pocket expenses associated 
with domestic and sexual violence.187 These programs currently are 
underresourced, underutilized, and underpublicized.188 Claimants 
generally cannot recover damages for pain and suffering or emotional 
distress.189 As currently constituted, they receive virtually no public 
funding or support. Yet they represent a powerful distributive justice 
approach through which defendants’ fines and fees are pooled and 
made available to victims. If domestic and sexual violence is under-
stood as a problem for which society shares responsibility, it should 
warrant allocation of public funds to assist victims. With relatively 
minimal public support and greater publicity about available bene-
fits, these compensation programs could become a far more useful 
tool through which victims of domestic and sexual violence can re-
cover for their resulting economic losses.190  
 
 186. See Goldscheid, supra note 49, at 228 (discussing congressional finding that 50% 
of victims of sexual assault lose their jobs afterward). For studies detailing the ways in 
which domestic and sexual violence causes and maintains victims’ poverty, see id. at 226-
28 (reviewing and citing studies); see also, e.g., Sandra S. Park, Working Towards Freedom 
from Abuse: Recognizing a “Public Policy” Exception to Employment-at-Will for Domestic 
Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 121 (2003); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Vic-
timizing the Abused?: Is Termination the Solution When Domestic Violence Comes to 
Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2006); Jill C. Robertson, Addressing Domestic Vio-
lence in the Workplace: An Employer’s Responsibility, 16 L. & INEQ. 633 (1998); Nina W. 
Tarr, Employment and Economic Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, Illinois Pub. L. 
& Legal Theory Research Paper No. 07-01, Jan. 18, 2007, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=958077; Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic Violence in the 
Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety Net?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 139 (2000). For a summary of publications addressing this issue, see, e.g., 
http://www.ncdsv.org/publications_workplace.html.  
 187. Goldscheid, supra note 49, at 179. 
 188. Id. at 190-91. 
 189. LISA NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF STATE 
VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT ASSISTANCE AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: TRENDS AND 
STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE, at xiii (Apr. 2003), available at 
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410924 (noting that only three states allow some recov-
ery for emotional distress damages). 
 190. In order to be most useful to victims, however, unduly restrictive requirements 
that currently limit programs’ effectiveness should be removed. Goldscheid, supra note 49, 
at 190-95. 
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 Other alternative approaches to compensation could open avenues 
to recovery as well. For example, more rigorous enforcement of resti-
tution provisions could afford recovery to victims. Restitution pro-
grams require the defendant in criminal actions to compensate vic-
tims for losses resulting from the crime.191 Every state and the fed-
eral government have provisions authorizing restitution, although 
the scope of coverage and enforcement varies widely.192 Although res-
titution necessarily is limited to cases in which there is a successful 
criminal prosecution, it exemplifies an alternative approach to eco-
nomic compensation that could prove valuable to victims without ex-
acting the toll of civil litigation.  
B.   Transforming Underlying Biases 
 While the factors described above limit civil rights remedies’ abil-
ity to deliver their promise of practical relief, other factors limit their 
power to reframe the discriminatory attitudes that underlie domestic 
and sexual violence. This Section discusses several of these factors: 
the ways in which sex discrimination is both an over- and underin-
clusive lens through which to frame the problem of domestic and 
sexual violence; the importance of reincorporating victims’ voices into 
reform strategies that address the social conditions that allow domes-
tic and sexual violence to persist; and the need to reincorporate debate 
about social factors, which include but are not limited to sex discrimina-
tion, as a central part of policy discourse about the problem. 
1.   Sex Discrimination as Over- and Underinclusive 
 A conceptual limitation in redressing domestic and sexual violence 
as a problem of sex discrimination is that sex discrimination is both 
an over- and underinclusive lens through which to describe the prob-
lem. Making the link between domestic and sexual violence and sex 
discrimination was a critical insight that transformed the way the 
problem came to be addressed. Since the 1970s, the expansion of le-
gal protections, policy responses, and social services addressing do-
mestic and sexual violence has dramatically expanded in the United 
States.193 Although few of the policy responses themselves address 
sex equality, arguments about sex equality played a critical role in 
the rhetoric and advocacy that led to those important reforms.194 The 
connection between violence and sex equality was integrally con-
nected to the women’s rights movement that tapped the emotions of 
the times and sparked unprecedented activism. Rhetorical descrip-
 
 191. For a general discussion of restitution programs, see id. at 177-81. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 362-73. 
 194. Id. at 363. 
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tions equating domestic and sexual violence with sex discrimination 
resonated with women’s experience of the problem and gave voice to 
a previously silenced understanding of its complexity. 
 Domestic and sexual violence still reflects and perpetuates sex 
discrimination. This can be seen in myriad ways. Domestic and sex-
ual violence continues to be committed disproportionately by men 
against women.195 The nature of the violence itself continues to re-
flect perpetrators’ biased attitudes.196 The justice system’s response, 
despite its improvements, serves as a constant reminder that sex-
based stereotypes continue to pervade the justice system.197 For ex-
ample, in one recent case, a judge presiding over domestic violence 
cases was accused of likening three women who sought protective or-
ders to “buses that come along every 10 minutes.”198
 But domestic and sexual violence is more complex than a unitary 
sex-based lens implies.199 Legal reforms that focus on sex discrimina-
tion to the exclusion of other social forces will not accurately capture 
 
 195. See supra note 18. 
 196. Cases litigated under the VAWA civil rights remedy and analogous state laws re-
flected the gender bias that continues to animate domestic and sexual violence. See, e.g., 
Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (noting that defendant’s use 
of gender-specific epithets, control over the family’s finances and wife’s passport, refusing 
to allow wife a role in family decisionmaking, and escalated attacks during her pregnancy 
and when she asserted her independence were evidence of gender animus); Brzonkala v. 
Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 785 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 169 F.3d 820 
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(noting that defendant’s statements that victim “ ‘better not have any fucking diseases’ ” 
and that he “ ‘like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them’ ” were evidence of 
gender animus); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98 C 2395, 1998 WL 673629 at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 
1998) (concluding that sexual assault by husband reflects gender bias). 
 197. For examples of bias by law enforcement officials, see Buel, supra note 173, at 
963-69 (describing examples of victim blaming by judges); Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s 
No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1063, 1063-64 (1995) (describing case in which a 
Baltimore County judge sentenced a man who killed his wife with a hunting rifle after 
finding her in bed with another man to eighteen months to be served on work release time 
plus fifty hours of community service in a domestic violence program, stating, “ ‘I seriously 
wonder how many married men, married five years or four years would have the 
strength to walk away, but without inflicting some corporal punishment . . . . I shudder 
to think what I would do.”); see also GENDER BIAS TASK FORCES, NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. 
PROJECT, LEGAL MOMENTUM, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, available at 
http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/programs/njep/2006/04/findings_recommendati
ons.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (observing that “[i]nstead of focusing on why men bat-
ter and what can be done to stop them, many judges and court personnel ask battered 
women what they did to provoke the violence, subject them to demeaning and sexist com-
ments, shuttle them from court to court, and issue mutual orders of protection when the 
respondent has not filed a cross-petition and there is no evidence that the petitioner was 
violent”); cf. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study 
of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1 (1996) (reviewing gender bias 
task forces).  
 198. Ruben Castaneda, Embattled Judge Rejects Charges of Misconduct, WASH. 
POST, June 1, 2006, at B07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2006/05/31/AR2006053102005.html?nav=rss_metro/md. 
 199. See infra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text. 
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the nature of the experience for many victims. This is particularly 
problematic to the extent that rights-based reform efforts can serve 
as a catalyst to a broader social movement. If remedies premised on 
the harm of sex discrimination do not fully describe the problem for 
victims, they will have less appeal as a practical matter and will be 
less effective as a catalyst for broader social change. 
 Sex-discrimination-based arguments have held tremendous rhe-
torical power in the United States and increasingly fuel international 
reform.200 The more nuanced our understanding of the problem be-
comes, however, the more important it is to credit the range of social 
and economic factors that define domestic and sexual violence, rather 
than rely on the single lens of gender. Renewed efforts to ground re-
form in the complex social and economic contexts that define victims’ 
experiences may ultimately be more effective in addressing the prob-
lem. Some important programs are doing just that.201  
2.   Reincorporating Victims’ Voices 
 Advocacy and reform efforts that link domestic and sexual vio-
lence with sex discrimination will be most powerful when they are 
tied to a broader social movement. This occurred in the wave of ac-
tivism that began in the 1970s, where sex discrimination argu-
ments coincided with the rising women’s movement and helped 
advance this most recent wave of advocacy to combat domestic and 
sexual violence. 
 Given the advances of the last thirty years and the shifting le-
gal and political backdrop, we should now revisit first principles. 
Feminist advocacy has been premised on the fundamental tenet 
that reform should be driven by women’s voices and experiences.202 
In evaluating the use of civil rights remedies, we should ask 
whether that lens continues to describe women’s experiences of 
the problem accurately.203  
 
 200. See Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 362-73 (citing sources). 
 201. See, e.g., Building Comprehensive Solutions to Domestic Violence: Increasing 
Economic Opportunity for Battered Women (Nat’l Res. Ctr. on Domestic Violence), 
available at http://www.vawnet.org/vnl/library/general/bcs_apub.htm (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2007), Janet Carter & Jill Davies, Domestic Violence and Poverty: Organizing 
an Advocacy Voice (Neighborhood Funders Group Fall 2000), available at 
http://www.nfg.org/reports/73domestic.htm; CONNECT: Safe Families, Peaceful 
Communities, at http://www.connectnyc.org/index.html; Close 2 Home, available at 
http://www.c2home.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).  
 202. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 203. To the extent that victims describe the problem as one of relationship or personal-
ity rather than sex or other forms of discrimination, some might argue that those re-
sponses reflect false consciousness. For discussions of false consciousness, see Tracy E. 
Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 
119-20 (1996); Mari Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1777-80 (1990). 
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 At least one recent study of domestic violence victims204 confirms 
what antiessentialist scholars have argued: that when asked about 
social and structural aspects of domestic and sexual violence, women 
of color tend to define domestic violence in terms of interlocking eco-
nomic political and social realities rather than in terms of gender 
alone.205 This result is consistent with commentators’ observations 
that the emphasis on gender to the neglect of class and race skewed 
the “movement” to focus on middle-class, white women.206  
 These studies also confirm the importance of concrete and eco-
nomic remedies and the disconnect between current criminal and 
civil justice responses and victims’ stated needs and concerns. For 
example, studies confirm women’s concern for shelter and financial 
support.207 For some, financial need is a “life-defining” circumstance 
that informed their response to the abuse.208 Another group of women 
believed that safety and community validation were more important 
than punishing or hurting the perpetrator.209 Other studies confirm 
the centrality of concrete resources in improving victims’ quality of 
life and in reducing their vulnerability to future abuse.210  
 A renewed commitment to grounding theory and strategy in vic-
tims’ experience may usefully shift the focus of reform. Further in-
quiry and dialog with victims could go a long way toward informing 
the nature of future initiatives. Promising organizing initiatives base 
advocacy and policy initiatives on survivors’ perspectives and priori-
 
 204. Only a few empirical studies appear to have addressed this question. See Judith 
Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim’s Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 571, 
579 (2005) (interviewing twenty-two victims of violent crime); Robin L. Nabi & Jennifer R. 
Horner, Victims with Voices: How Abused Women Conceptualize the Problem of Spousal 
Abuse and Implications for Intervention and Prevention, 16 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 237, 239-42 
(2001) (conducting telephone survey of Philadelphia adults comparing views of abuse com-
pared to nonabused women); Laura Nichols & Kathryn M. Feltey, “The Woman Is Not Al-
ways the Bad Guy”: Dominant Discourse and Resistance in the Lives of Battered Women, 9 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 784, 788 (2003) (surveying women living in a battered women’s 
shelter in a midwest urban area). 
 205. Nichols & Feltey, supra note 204, at 800-01. For example, women of color in that 
study cited the lack of shelters and services, inadequate legal protections, and misplaced 
funding priorities that favored military spending as opposed to social problems such as home-
lessness and domestic violence. Id. at 799-801. By contrast, the woman in that study who fo-
cused exclusively on gender oppression was a woman of European descent. See id. at 799.  
 206. McMahon & Pence, supra note 171, at 55. 
 207. Nichols & Feltey, supra note 204, at 790. 
 208. Id. at 794. 
 209. Herman, supra note 204, at 585-97. 
 210. See Chris M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, Reducing Violence Using Community-
Based Advocacy for Women with Abusive Partners, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 43, 43-44, 49-53 (1999). For a general discussion of the centrality of concrete ser-
vices and materials resources to domestic violence victims’ well being and safety, see 
Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor 
Women of Color, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, 
GENDER AND CULTURE 369 (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt eds., 2005). 
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ties.211 Accordingly, in addition to civil litigation strategies, reforms 
that address the economic harms and that directly challenge the in-
terlocking social realities that shape victims’ experiences may be 
more responsive to victims’ needs.  
3.   Recentering Debate About Discrimination 
 To the extent that laws such as the civil rights remedy seek to 
shift underlying discriminatory attitudes, there is no substitute for 
exposing and addressing those attitudes directly. Increased aware-
ness and visibility of domestic and sexual violence may erroneously 
fuel perceptions that the problem is adequately being addressed and 
that law enforcement officers and judges adequately have been 
trained how best to address the problem. Yet discrimination contin-
ues to infuse both the circumstances under which violence is commit-
ted and society’s responses to those seeking help.212  These examples 
should continue to be publicized and those responsible must be held 
accountable for their acts. 
 If the modification of popular culture’s images of women can 
help shift discriminatory attitudes, such shifts should be sup-
ported and encouraged. Promising initiatives involve violence pre-
vention programs that target both men and women.213 Other pro-
grams are engaging men in the project of challenging discrimina-
tory attitudes and social norms that treat domestic and sexual vio-
lence as acceptable responses.214  
 Moreover, much may be gained from reincorporating debate about 
the social context in which domestic and sexual violence occurs into 
the mainstream discourse about the problem. This debate should in-
clude, but not be limited to, gender bias. The growth of the domestic 
and sexual violence service networks and the expanded range of leg-
islative reform has shifted the tenor of reform from social context to 
social services. Interventions that address social context can lead to 
creative advocacy. For example, victims might support programs 
with youth that identify and challenge the ways that domestic and 
sexual violence is rooted in sex-based stereotypes. Other programs 
might challenge ongoing gender bias in law enforcement responses. 
 
 211. See Rhea V. Almeida & Judith Lockard, The Cultural Context Model: A New 
Paradigm for Accountability, Empowerment, and the Development of Critical Conscious-
ness against Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER AND CULTURE, supra note 210, at 301 (describing cultural context 
model for addressing domestic violence); see also supra note 201 (citing sources). 
 212. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text. 
 213. See, e.g., CDC, Intimate Partner Violence: Prevention Strategies, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/ipvprevention.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (discuss-
ing approaches and listing resources).   
 214. See, e.g., JACKSON KATZ, THE MACHO PARADOX: WHY SOME MEN HURT WOMEN 
AND HOW ALL MEN CAN HELP (2006). 
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Still others might challenge the economic inequalities that limit 
women’s choices through initiatives such as living wage campaigns 
or other community organizing initiatives. Throughout, renewed 
discussion about the enduring role of gender and other forms of bias 
and how that bias informs the perpetuation of and systemic re-
sponses to domestic and sexual violence can produce useful new dia-
log and advocacy initiatives.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Civil rights remedies are an important component of the range of 
legal tools available to victims of domestic and sexual violence. Like 
other remedies, however, they are constrained by limitations inher-
ent in the nature of the remedy and the nature of the problem they 
are intended to address. This Article has analyzed the extent to 
which civil rights remedies meet two of their intended goals: increas-
ing access to compensation for the losses resulting from abuse and 
transforming public awareness of the problem. A variety of consid-
erations—including survivors’ rational reluctance to reengage with 
an abuser—will deter victims from invoking civil rights remedies in 
many cases. The transformative potential of civil rights remedies is 
constrained by the limited reach of such cases to produce policy 
changes and the inability of rights-based claims, divorced from 
broader social and grassroots organizing efforts, to bring about 
broader social change.  
 Alternative approaches effectively can complement civil remedies 
in increasing avenues for recovery from the financial losses resulting 
from abuse. Initiatives that directly address the economic inequali-
ties that domestic and sexual violence produce, such as enhanced vic-
tim compensation programs and more rigorous enforcement of resti-
tution provisions, can increase victims’ access to financial compensa-
tion without requiring reengagement with an abuser. Efforts to ad-
dress doctrinal gaps that allow institutions to escape liability for in-
adequately addressing the problem also can enhance victims’ recov-
ery and promote institutional accountability.  
 The most compelling arguments in support of the civil rights rem-
edy surrounded its promise to help transform public opinion and atti-
tudes about the problem. While the civil rights remedies still in effect 
may advance that goal, other approaches to eliminating the gender 
bias and other biases that continue to inform domestic and sexual 
violence warrant attention. Advocacy grounded in survivors’ experi-
ences and initiatives that directly challenge those enduring biases 
hold promise to shift social norms and help us move another step to-
ward advancing safety and equality. 
 
